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THE INVISIBLE WOMAN: AVAILABILITY
AND CULPABILITY IN REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE
BETH A. BURKSTRAND-REID*
Women's health is widely assumed to be a significant consid-
eration in reproductive rights cases. Court decisions relating
to contraception, abortion, and childbirth demonstrate that
while this assumption may have historical validity, consid-
eration of women's health is often truncated in recent repro-
ductive rights jurisprudence. This occurs, in part, through
the application of one or both of two recurring tools.
First, judges regularly-and often inaccurately-cite the
theoretical availability of alternative reproductive health
services as proof that women's health will not suffer even if a
law curtailing reproductive rights is upheld. I label this the
"availability tool." Second, when alternatives are not avail-
able, judges may blame women for the lack of available ser-
vices or procedures. I call this the "culpability tool." Al-
though the availability and culpability tools can be applied
in a manner that appropriately considers women's health, of-
ten they are not. Thus, the availability and culpability tools
contribute to the undervaluing of women's health in repro-
ductive health jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
"Health is the first of all liberties . . . .
-Henri Frederic Amiell
If health is the first of all liberties, then, for women, repro-
ductive health is liberty's foundation.2 Specifically, the ability
to control one's fertility is a health issue: medical and surgical
technologies that promote, prevent, or terminate pregnancy
pose risks to women's health,3 as do pregnancy and childbirth.4
1. HENRI-FRtDtRIC AMIEL, AMIEL'S JOURNAL: THE JOURNAL INTIME OF
HENRI-FREDERIC AMIEL 104 (Mrs. Humphry Ward trans., MacMillan & Co. 2d ed.
1889) (1885).
2. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 383 (1985) (arguing that a woman's
ability to control her reproductive capacity is equivalent to her ability to take
autonomous charge of her life).
3. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., BIRTH CONTROL GUIDE (2009),
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/ucml18465.htm (list-
ing the contraceptive technologies and the corresponding risks, including the fol-
lowing: oral, vaginal, and patch hormonal contraceptives (dizziness, nausea,
changes in menstruation, mood, and weight, cardiovascular disease, including
high blood pressure, blood clots, heart attacks, and strokes); intrauterine devices
(pelvic inflammatory disease, infertility, and perforation of the uterus); and
diaphragm, cervical cap, or sponge with spermicide (allergic reaction, urinary
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But women's health is not just a medical issue: increasingly it
is political, with both proponents and opponents of reproductive
rights accusing the other of using women's health to further a
political agenda.5
Reproductive health considerations have long been present
in reproductive rights jurisprudence. 6  Today, however,
women's health is considered alongside an ever-increasing and
ever-politicized array of highly charged competing interests,
such as religious freedom, physicians' rights to practice as they
see fit, and, most controversially, the rights, if any, of a fetus.7
As women's health competes with other interests of potentially
constitutional dimensions, it triggers a legally and ideologically
loaded confrontation that judges quite understandably may
want to avoid.
An analysis of recent, major reproductive rights decisions
involving contraception, abortion, or childbirth reveals that
judges can-and do--avoid or abbreviate consideration of the
impact a law may have on women's health by looking to the
health care marketplace for available alternatives to the
tract infections, and toxic shock syndrome)); see also infra Part II.B(2) (including
cases that discuss the risks of various abortion procedures).
"Women's health," as used in this Article, includes all mental or physical
health considerations that can impact women's ability to fully participate in
society, including the ability to choose whether, when, and how to become a
mother, and to have access to the safest medical services necessary to effectuate
that choice.
4. One in 4,800 women dies from "pregnancy-related causes" in the United
States during their lifetime ranking it 41st in the world in maternal mortality.
See WOMEN DELIVER, MATERNAL MORTALITY SCORECARD (2007),
http://www.womendeliver.org/fact/MM-Country Rankings-factsheet_(A4).pdf (cit-
ing Ireland as having the lowest mortality rate of 1 in 47,600, and noting that the
study "almost certainly understate[s]" the problem).
5. One recent example of the women's health debate occurred during the fi-
nal 2008 presidential debate, when Sen. John McCain used his fingers to put "air
quotes" around the word "health," suggesting that women's reproductive health
concerns are used disingenuously by pro-abortion rights advocates to argue for
fewer abortion restrictions. See Jason Linkins, McCain Mockingly Suggests that
Concerns for a Mother's Health are Extreme, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 15, 2008,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/15/mccain-mockingly-suggests-n_135072
.html.
6. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937-38 (2000) (discussing the
fatal lack of a health exception in a "partial-birth" abortion ban); Hodgson v. Min-
nesota, 497 U.S. 417, 465-67 (1990) (discussing the potential health impact
parental notification has on minor women's health); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 690 (1977) (explaining that restrictions on the sale of "nonha-
zardous" contraception did not further a state interest in health); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 144-53 (1973) (discussing the health risks to women from illegal
abortion and from pregnancy itself).
7. See infra Parts II-III.
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threatened reproductive health service.8 If such alternatives
are available, judges may cite them both as guarantors of
women's continuing ability to access the service needed and as
vindicators of women's reproductive health.9 I call this the
"availability tool." The problem with the availability tool is
this: when applied incorrectly, it focuses the analysis primarily,
if not solely, on the ends desired (e.g., can women still termi-
nate a pregnancy even in the face of an abortion procedure
ban?) and neglects the importance of the means (e.g., whether
the remaining abortion method is as safe or safer than the one
banned).
When judges use the availability tool, the availability in-
voked may appear in one or more of several forms. It may take
the form of the citation of statistics on the use of a specific
product or service and the identification of potential substi-
tutes.10 A judge may compare different services or even pro-
viders.II Regardless of the type of availability discussed, avail-
ability of alternatives often serves as a surrogate for a complete
analysis of how the law at issue would impact women's health.
Hypothetically, the availability tool can be used to protect
women's health-in fact, there are cases where courts do just
that-but often the availability tool, as applied, is an analytical
shortcut that shortchanges women. Consider a hypothetical
jurisdiction where the only methods of birth control available
are diaphragms, oral contraception, and intrauterine devices
("IUDs"). If a law banning diaphragms was passed, for exam-
ple, a judge incorrectly applying the availability tool might
uphold that law, citing women's ability to access the alterna-
tive birth control methods, oral contraceptives or IUDs, as evi-
dence that a diaphragm ban would not impact women's health.
However, a correct application of the availability tool should
lead to the diaphragm ban's demise. The judge who correctly
uses the availability tool would not stop at a mere citation of
available alternatives as guarantors of women's health. The
8. See infra Part II. Compare Alex M. Azar II, Deputy Sec'y of Health and
Human Servs., The Importance of Competition in Health Care (May 3, 2006),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/deputysecretary/depsecspeeches/060503.html
(suggesting that health care is a commodity that obeys economic laws), with Gina
Kolata, As Abortion Rate Decreases, Clinics Compete for Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
30, 2000, at A13 (citing sociologist Carole Joffee as questioning whether abortion
is truly part of the health care industry or is instead part of a social movement).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.
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judge should find that no true replacement for diaphragms is
available for women in this hypothetical jurisdiction: oral con-
traceptives are contraindicated for women with certain car-
diovascular risks, and IUDs are contraindicated for women
with a history of pelvic infection and, perhaps, for women who
want to have children in the future.12 Theoretically, because
the diaphragm can be a safer method for certain populations of
women, the ban should fail if the tool is applied correctly. In
fact, in this hypothetical, banning any of the three contracep-
tives would increase the health risks for some women by either
making the most effective method of pregnancy prevention
unavailable for those women (thus making pregnancy and its
attendant risks more likely), imposing increased health risks
presented by the non-banned methods themselves, or both.
As the hypothetical diaphragm ban shows, the proper ap-
plication of the availability tool requires two steps: (1) identify-
ing available, potential substitutes for the provider, product, or
service in question; and then (2) analyzing whether those
alternatives are true substitutes with equivalent or better
health risk profiles. In other words, inquiring about the avail-
ability of alternatives is appropriate, but judges must also de-
termine whether the available alternatives are adequate sub-
stitutes given all health considerations in order for the tool to
be used in a way that vindicates women's health interests. An
analysis of relevant jurisprudence shows that judges often use
the availability tool, as it is identified and described in this Ar-
ticle, incorrectly: judges complete step one of the tool but neg-
lect step two, thus failing to complete the analysis. 13 This is
not to say that women's health is not mentioned or even briefly
discussed in these cases-it often is-but the analysis of the
impact on women's health is often perfunctory.14 In such deci-
sions, judges frequently point to the presence of theoretically
available alternative reproductive health services without per-
12. See KAREN J. CARLSON ET AL., THE NEW HARVARD GUIDE TO WOMEN'S
HEALTH 319 (2004) ("IUDs are generally not considered a good choice of birth con-
trol for women who want to bear children in the future . . . ."); ALAN H.
DECHERNEY ET AL., CURRENT DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT: OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 581-90 (10th ed. 2007) (describing the relatively minor risks of
diaphragms; the comparatively major risks of oral contraceptives, especially for
women with diabetes and certain cardiovascular diseases; and the rare but
serious risk of uterine complications presented by IUDs, especially in certain
women).
13. See generally infra Part II (discussing availability of multiple providers
and availability of multiple procedures).
14. See infra Part II.
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forming a nuanced analysis of the impact a legal restriction
may have on women's health (either generally or on a specific
class of women). 15
The availability tool cannot be used in all cases. Most not-
ably, it should be useless when there is no available alternative
for the product, procedure or practitioner being regulated.
However, when alternatives are not available, judges may sug-
gest that women themselves are culpable for a perceived failure
to access reproductive health services at a time when alterna-
tives may have been available. I call this the "culpability tool."
By using the culpability tool, judges can imply that the woman
at issue let her options die out, leaving her (and the judge) in a
predicament where alternatives are not present and cannot be
relied upon as the protector of the woman's health.16 In these
cases, which include abortion and court-ordered cesarean sec-
tion decisions, the weight of the woman's health interest-even
when discussed-is downplayed because the woman is pre-
sented as having voluntarily waived previously available
options. 17
Childbirth-related controversies provide an ideal backdrop
for the application of the culpability tool. When a laboring
woman refuses to have a cesarean section despite her physi-
cian's contrary advice, that physician may seek a court order
requiring the woman to have the surgery against her will, and
the judge may cite the woman's alleged failure to find an obste-
trician willing to support her preferred delivery method as evi-
dence her decision is wrong, thus portraying the lack of avail-
able delivery options as her own fault.18 This application of the
culpability tool fails to adequately account for the risks to the
woman's health that a cesarean section poses (regardless of any
culpability on her part), and it also fails to examine whether
the pregnant woman's inability to locate a provider willing to
supervise her chosen delivery method was truly because her
request was medically unsound or stemmed from market-based
issues such as the limited availability of obstetrical care in a
particular location.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III (discussing how some courts cite a woman's choice not
to terminate a pregnancy as the basis for accepting state regulation of the
pregnancy).
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.
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Hypothetically, the culpability tool could function to pro-
tect women's health. Such could be the case in the unlikely
event where a woman makes a medical decision that is truly
unwise and is certain to result in her death and fetal death, for
example. But, in this unlikely scenario, the court would still
have to wrestle with a woman's strong autonomy interest. 19
This Article (1) identifies and labels the operation of the
availability and culpability tools in several significant repro-
ductive rights decisions; (2) describes how those tools are ap-
plied in different reproductive health contexts (preventing
pregnancy, terminating pregnancy, and obtaining obstetrical
services); and (3) questions whether the use of these tools im-
pacts women's health, either beneficially or detrimentally.
This analysis demonstrates that although the tools have the
ability to vindicate women's health, more often their use re-
sults in the undervaluing of women's health relative to compet-
ing interests. Thus, the availability and culpability tools, as
typically applied, contribute to the de-emphasis of women's
health in significant reproductive rights decisions.
This Article neither claims that the tools are universally
present in all reproductive health cases nor asserts that their
presence explains the outcome of all reproductive health
cases. 20 Rather, it identifies, labels, and describes the tools' re-
cent and repeated use by federal and state courts, suggests
that their historic and current use will continue to impact judi-
cial analysis of women's reproductive health issues, and finally
examines the true utility of the tools going forward.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the significant
role reproductive rights play in women's push for equality,
briefly tracing the evolution of reproductive health law and pol-
icy from the early twentieth century to present.
Part II discusses the availability tool. Section A argues
that Planned Parenthood v. Casey created a jurisprudential en-
vironment in which the availability tool (and its counterpart,
19. See infra Part III.
20. The number and type of reproductive rights cases is vast. For this Article,
I examined recent precedent representative of three phases in many women's re-
productive lives: pregnancy prevention (federal cases involving pharmacists' re-
fusal to dispense contraception), pregnancy termination (federal cases involving
abortion providers or procedures), and childbirth (state cases involving court-
ordered cesarean sections). This paper does not make empirical claims about the
frequency with which the availability and culpability tools are used but rather
demonstrates that they are used in some of the most significant-and binding-
recent reproductive rights decisions.
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the culpability tool) can thrive. Next, it explains how the
availability tool functions in actual controversies, showing that
the manner of application significantly impacts whether
women's health is adequately valued. Section B focuses on
cases in which provider availability is threatened, and Section
C examines cases in which procedure availability is threatened.
Part III describes the culpability tool and how it holds
women responsible for their alleged role in the narrowing of
their reproductive health care options. Section A indentifies
and describes the two most common reproductive-health-
related choices women make that may subsequently be used
against them via the culpability tool. Section B examines
cesarean section case law, demonstrating that the culpability
tool often functions in a way that may unfairly assign blame to
women, truncates women's health analyses, and ultimately
leads courts to undervalue women's health interests relative to
competing interests.
Part IV discusses whether there is a legitimate, ongoing
use for the availability and culpability tools. From a normative
perspective, Section A finds that the availability and culpa-
bility tools can theoretically be used in ways that adequately
value women's health but asserts that the requisites for proper
application are onerous and often not followed by courts. Sec-
tion B sets forth the minimum criteria for the tools to operate
successfully in real cases involving women's reproductive
health issues.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
Women's ability to safely control their reproductive capac-
ity has long been central to women's struggle for equality.21 In
1914, women's health pioneer Margaret Sanger declared that
the "first step towards getting life, liberty or the pursuit of
happiness for any woman is her decision whether or not she
shall become a mother."22 Then and now, birth control was
seen by many as necessary to enable women's full participation
21. See ALEXANDER SANGER, BEYOND CHOICE: REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 71 (2004).
22. See id. at 33. See generally RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER: A
SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA (2005) (describing the
history of reproductive politics).
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in society. 23 And when women experienced an unplanned
pregnancy, many accessed abortion services-legal or not.24
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as
women's ability to regulate their reproductive lives grew, so did
the recognition that such control impacted women's equality. 25
The legal recognition of the right to access contraception for
married persons in 1965 and for unmarried couples in 1972
enabled women to improve their status in both the private and
public sphere by allowing them to plan childbearing and enter
the paid labor force. 26 Now, 98 percent of women use contra-
ception at some point in their lives, making it one of the most
widely used forms of health care.27
Legal recognition of abortion rights soon followed. In 1973,
Roe v. Wade established the legal right to have an abortion. In
doing so, the foundational case cited the significance of
women's health literally dozens of times, discussing both the
health risks posed by pregnancy itself as well as by abortion. 28
23. See generally Judith G. Waxman, Privacy and Reproductive Rights: Where
We've Been and Where We're Going, 68 MONT. L. REV. 299 (2007) (discussing the
history of women's attempts to control their reproductive capacity from ancient
Greece to present).
24. See SANGER, supra note 21, at 19-47 (tracing reproductive rights debates
prior to the eighteenth century through today); SOLINGER, supra note 22, at 118
(stating that 25-40 percent of all pregnancies were terminated during the
depression).
25. See Naomi Cahn & Anne T. Goldstein, Roe and Its Global Impact, 6 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 695, 699 (2004) ("Indeed, the right to an abortion and the availability
of contraceptives have been linked in the United States to women's increased abil-
ity to make career and marriage choices and to improve their status in the house-
hold."); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their
Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 819
(2007) (arguing that control over reproduction is necessary for women's dignity
and to repudiate the assumption that women's primary function is to care for
others).
26. See JUDITH F. DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 104-17
(2006) (discussing the impact of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
legalizing contraceptives for married couples and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), legalizing contraception for individuals); Martha J. Bailey, More Pow-
er to the Pill: The Impact of Contraceptive Freedom on Women's Life Cycle Labor
Supply, 121 Q.J. ECON. 289, 317 (2006) (concluding through empirical analysis of
employment data that contraceptive availability catapulted women into the
workplace). But see GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 106-07 (1981)
(asserting that birth control was merely part of the reason why fertility rates de-
clined in the United States).
27. See NARAL Pro-Choice America, Issues: Birth Control, http://naral.org/
issues/birthscontroll (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
28. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("Specific and direct harm med-
ically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or addi-
tional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psycho-
logical harm may be imminent.").
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Now, approximately one-third of all women in the United
States have an abortion at some point in their lives. 29
The Supreme Court has resisted efforts to overturn Roe,
even saying that "[t]he ability of women to participate equally
in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facili-
tated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."30 But
the Court faces a crush of litigation over the contours of repro-
ductive rights, and ultimately has allowed substantial govern-
ment restrictions to be placed on their exercise. 31
Despite the limited legal protections afforded by reproduc-
tive rights jurisprudence and the medical advances in repro-
ductive health technology, women today still face substantial
reproductive health risks.32 Pregnant women in the United
States are subject to significant pregnancy-related morbidity
and mortality. 33 Contraceptives, even when accessible, still
pose health risks 34 and development of new contraceptives is
29. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, IN BRIEF: FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN
THE UNITED STATES (2008), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb-induced abor
tion.html (explaining that 50 percent of women having abortions are younger than
twenty-five and 60 percent of all abortions are sought by women who have one or
more children).
30. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
31. Whether there exists a general constitutional right to make autonomous
health decisions-reproductive or otherwise-is an issue that remains unsettled
by the Supreme Court and is beyond the scope of this paper. For an in-depth
analysis of this issue, see B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical
Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277 (2007), which
argues that a general right to make autonomous medical decisions is found in
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
32. See June Carbone, If I Say "Yes" to Regulation Today, Will You Still Re-
spect Me in the Morning?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1747, 1748-50 (2008) (asserting
that African-Americans have greater rates of reproductive health illness, likely
because of less access to medical care). See generally Pamela D. Bridgewater, Re-
constructing Rationality: Towards a Critical Economic Theory of Reproduction, 56
EMORY L.J. 1215 (2007) (theorizing whether a regulated market for health ser-
vices might improve women's lives).
33. See WOMEN DELIVER, supra note 4 (discussing maternal mortality world-
wide); see also infra Part III (discussing various childbirth-related health issues).
See generally HEIDI MURKOFF & SHARON MAZEL, WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN YOU'RE
EXPECTING (4th ed. 2008) (detailing the myriad of health issues that can be
caused or complicated by pregnancy).
34. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 855-56 (4th ed., Aspen Publishers 2006) (dis-
cussing the history of tort litigation surrounding the risks of various birth control
technologies and emphasizing problems with Dalkon Shield intrauterine devices);
BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES: A NEW
EDITION FOR A NEW ERA 326-80 (35th Anniversary ed. 2005) (arguing that birth
control is often approved by the Food and Drug Administration before its long-
term health effects are understood and detailing the health risks of every major
contraceptive technology); David Voreacos & Patricia Hurtado, J&J Pays $1.25
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slow. 35 Continuing limitations on the availability of abortion
providers and procedures curtail women's ability to safely plan
whether and when to have a child.36 In short, inadequate
access to safe, affordable reproductive health care continues to
result in a tangible loss of liberty for women.37
It is in this context that courts must decide whether con-
traception, abortion, and childbirth-related regulations pose a
risk to women's health and, additionally, what that risk might
mean to women's autonomy. It is difficult to decouple women's
health from the polarizing moral and political controversies
surrounding their reproductive capacity-controversies that
any person-judge or not-may understandably want to avoid.
As the cases discussed below demonstrate, the availability and
culpability tools facilitate such avoidance.
II. AVAILABILITY
The availability of alternative reproductive health services
and products is cited in myriad reproductive rights cases, in
varying manners and to varying degrees. 38 For example, in
Million to Settle Suit Over Death of 14-Year-Old, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 24, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aTTqmPEzxr9U
(discussing suits by 2,400 users claiming they developed blood clots in their legs
or lungs after using a contraceptive patch).
35. See Dawn MacKeen, Brave New World?, SALON, Aug. 11, 1999,
http://dir.salon.com/health/feature/1999/08/11/contraceptives/index.html (quoting
one contraception researcher as saying that the United States is in the "back-
waters" of contraceptive development).
36. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261,
360-61 (1992) (discussing a poll of Louisiana residents showing that 79 percent
opposed abortion when the rationale for the decision was concern over the effect of
childbearing on a woman's career).
37. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992)
("That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full
term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must
bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race been en-
dured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to
the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make
the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture."); see also Rebecca J.
Cook, Human Rights and Reproductive Self-Determination, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 975,
984 (1995) (noting that women's participation in society outside the home con-
tinues to be balanced against their reproductive capacity).
38. It is worth noting that the reproductive health care market's operation is
not completely understood from an economic standpoint. See Deborah Haas-
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pharmacist refusal controversies, in which pharmacists decline
to dispense contraceptives (whether by prescription or over-the-
counter) for religious or personal reasons, the presence of other
pharmacies or pharmacists may be cited to show that the
refusal of any one provider to dispense birth control will not
impact women's health.39 But the availability of large numbers
of competing providers or procedures is not required to use the
availability tool: in areas of more limited availability, such as
abortion, reliance on the availability tool is identifiable. 40 In
each area of reproductive health jurisprudence, the manner in
which the availability tool is employed may differ, but the re-
sult is almost always the same: consideration of women's
health is truncated based on an unstated yet apparent assump-
tion that the availability of other health services will protect
women from any significant adverse impact from the regulation
in question.4 1 Although they do exist, cases in which the avail-
ability tool appropriately analyzes women's health interests
appear to be few and far between.
Part II describes the modern jurisprudential underpin-
nings of the availability tool and how its application impacts
reproductive health jurisprudence. Section A discusses
Planned Parenthood v. Casey42 and how both its rhetoric and
its adoption of the "undue burden" standard invited further re-
liance on the presence of availability in reproductive rights
analysis.43 Sections B and C analyze judicial use of the avail-
ability tool-specifically, how judges use references to theoreti-
cally available alternative providers and procedures as a reas-
surance that women's health will not be adversely impacted by
legal restrictions on reproductive rights. Part II concludes by
uniting all availability tactics to discuss their collective import
in reproductive rights jurisprudence.
Wilson & Kristen Lindberg, Regulation and the Optimal Size and Type of Abor-
tion Provider, 31 APPLIED ECON. 409, 409 (1999).
39. See infra Part I.B.
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. For an example showing how availability may not protect women's health,
see Jennifer 8. Lee & Cara Buckley, For Privacy's Sake, Taking Risks to End
Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at Al5, discussing the fact that although le-
gal abortion is available, many women in particular communities resort to illegal
techniques for terminating pregnancies because of lack of money to pay for legal
termination, problems with clinic protestors, and other reasons.
42. 505 U.S. 833.
43. See infra Part H.A.
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A. Availability Facilitated: Planned Parenthood v. Casey
Casey's impact on reproductive rights jurisprudence is irre-
futable. 44 The 1992 case simultaneously addressed a panoply
of abortion restrictions:45 it affirmed Roe v. Wade's general pro-
tection of a woman's right to have an abortion,46 rejected Roe's
trimester framework for judging the constitutionality of abor-
tion restrictions, 47 and adopted the "undue burden" standard
for adjudicating reproductive rights disputes.48 Casey's impact
reverberates today: by explicitly linking women's reproductive
health to women's participation in the economy and by intro-
ducing the undue burden standard, Casey arguably facilitated
judicial use of the availability and culpability tools in reproduc-
tive rights jurisprudence.
At issue in Casey was the constitutionality of numerous
Pennsylvania state restrictions on abortion, including "in-
formed consent,"49 husband notification,50 parental consent
regulations, 51 a mandatory waiting period prior to receiving
abortion services, 52 and the extensive regulation of facilities
44. For a thorough discussion of the impact of Casey on subsequent reproduc-
tive rights cases, see Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflec-
tions on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317 (2006),
arguing that Casey has the ability to meaningfully protect reproductive rights if
applied correctly by courts.
45. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
46. Id. at 869-71.
47. Id. at 872-73 (describing the trimester framework as "rigid" and "unne-
cessary" to protect both the woman's interest in having an abortion and the state's
interests).
48. Id. at 874-79 ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on
a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.").
49. Id. at 881-83 (explaining that "informed consent" requires that a woman
be provided with state-authored materials prior to terminating a pregnancy and
holding that the law was a constitutionally permissible expression of the state's
preference against abortion).
50. Id. at 887-98 (finding that the husband notification requirement posed a
substantial obstacle for women facing domestic violence, thus violating their con-
stitutional rights).
51. Id. at 899-900 (upholding the parental consent requirement and noting
that such a requirement had been upheld in several prior U.S. Supreme Court
cases).
52. Id. at 886-87 (describing the twenty-four hour "waiting period" as poten-
tially increasing women's exposure to anti-abortion protester harassment and
being particularly burdensome for rural or poor women, but upholding the
regulation).
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where abortions were provided. 53 Most significantly, Casey
presented the Court with the opportunity to overturn Roe.54
In 1973, Roe established a woman's constitutional right to
have an abortion and outlined the trimester framework for
judging the constitutionality of abortion regulations.55 In the
first trimester of a woman's pregnancy, the pregnant woman
and her physician controlled the decision to terminate a preg-
nancy; during the second trimester, the state could regulate
abortion for the purpose of protecting women's health; and
post-viability, the state could outlaw abortion as long as it pro-
vided an exception for the life and the health of the pregnant
woman. 56 Roe centered on the premise that the health of the
pregnant woman was of paramount concern, regardless of
whether the risks at issue related to the abortion or to health
concerns stemming from the pregnancy itself.57
Although Casey preserved Roe's holding protecting a wom-
an's constitutional right to have an abortion,58 it rejected the
trimester framework in favor of a standard that permitted
more state regulation of abortion: the undue burden standard,
which simply asks whether a regulation "has the purpose or ef-
fect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."59 Using this new
standard, Casey upheld all of the regulations at issue in the
case save for the husband-notification requirement (and its re-
lated record-keeping requirements). 60 Casey's impact has ex-
tended far beyond the original controversy in question. Its un-
due burden test markedly altered the way in which jurists
approach questions of women's health, including facilitating
the application of the availability tool.
53. Id. at 900-01 (upholding various record-keeping requirements, but finding
those related to husband notice unconstitutional).
54. "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet nineteen years
after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy . . . that definition of liberty is still questioned." Id. at 844 (citation
omitted).
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing the framework by which
state regulation of abortion was judged until the Casey decision).
56. Id. at 163.
57. See id. at 113; see also CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION
RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE 99-100 (1990) (quoting Sara Wed-
dington, Roe's attorney, as asserting that pregnancy "is perhaps one of the most
determinative aspects of [a woman's] life," disrupting her body, education,
employment, and family).
58. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46.
59. See id. at 872-77.
60. Id. at 900-01.
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Although judges applied the availability tool in reproduc-
tive health cases prior to Casey, Casey further enables its ap-
plication.61 First, it explicitly ties the availability of reproduc-
tive health services to women's ability to participate in the
public sphere. Second, Casey's undue burden test de-
emphasizes women's health as an interest. Casey, therefore,
simultaneously emphasizes access and puts the importance of
women's health on uncertain terms. Moreover, under the un-
due burden standard, issues of access to reproductive services
and health can be treated simultaneously, making it easy to
assume-correctly or incorrectly-that access and health ques-
tions should be treated as interchangeable and analyzed
accordingly.
Casey directly ties the availability of specific reproductive
health services to women's ability to fully participate in society.
Casey says:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments,
people have organized intimate relationships and made
choices that define their views of themselves and their plac-
es in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in
the event that contraception should fail. The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control
their reproductive lives.62
This link is significant, as it signals to future courts that avail-
ability (and, arguably, the availability of multiple providers or
services) is important in any reproductive rights analysis inso-
far as availability protects women's autonomy. Although this
rhetoric may be pleasing to some, it fails to separate the signi-
ficance of women's sheer ability to access reproductive health
services from their ability to access them as safely as possible.
Arguably, the shift from the Roe trimester framework to
the Casey undue burden standard signaled a de-emphasis of
women's health in reproductive health jurisprudence. Roe's
protection of women's health was two-fold: its framework cen-
tered on whether abortion regulations were "promoting" the
state interest in women's health and, additionally, required an
exception for the protection of women's health as other inter-
ests became compelling. 63 Casey's undue burden test aban-
61. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
62. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (emphasis added).
63. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
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doned the notion that protecting women's health should be a
central state interest. Under the undue burden standard, some
burden on the woman is acceptable: the total burden on a
woman is simply judged to be substantial or not.64 The ques-
tion is, then, how much of a burden on a woman's health must
exist for it to be "substantial"? Do women have a right to the
safest procedure or service or simply a safe procedure, however
(and by whomever) that is defined? 65 This question has direct
bearing on the operation of the availability tool because it goes
to how close of a "fit" an available alternative has to be in order
to be considered sufficient to protect women's health. The
change from the trimester framework to the undue burden
standard, therefore, makes it easier to misapply the avail-
ability tool. 66
Under the undue burden standard, health issues can be
considered side-by-side with issues of access, so health con-
cerns can-correctly or incorrectly-be compensated for by the
presence of competition, ensuring that no health burden rises
to the level of being "substantial" or "undue."67 As will be seen
in cases discussed below, if judges use the availability tool, the
continued existence of the reproductive health provider or ser-
vice at issue (or a suitable substitute) can be used to assuage
concerns that a regulation burdens women's health. It is worth
noting, however, that the tool sometimes demonstrates the lack
of available and suitable alternatives and thus compels a law's
downfall. 68
64. See Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard:
Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2033
(1994) (noting the fact that the undue burden standard doesn't weigh countervail-
ing interests supports the argument that it is something less than intermediate
scrutiny, which does require such weighing).
65. See id. (noting that what constitutes an undue burden is inherently sub-
jective as the determination rests on the threshold set by a particular court for
what is "undue").
66. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights
After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 699-700 (2004) (suggesting
that Casey "subsumed" the medical exception within the undue burden test, ra-
ther than requiring two separate analyses). Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
923-38 (2000), suggested that a separate analysis was required in some cases.
Metzger, supra note 64, at 706. However, as we will see in later cases, courts con-
tinue to conflate the health and undue burden analyses and do so with the aid of
the availability tool. See infra Parts II.B-C.
67. See SANGER, supra note 21, at 55 (asserting that Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Casey removed abortion from the medical realm and shifted the focus of
abortion jurisprudence to a "quasi-feminist" vision of autonomy, which allowed for
greater political influence over women's childbearing decisions).
68. See generally infra Parts II.B-C.
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Casey's impact is not limited to cases in which the undue
burden standard applies. Its tandem consideration of health
and availability provides a roadmap for the use of the avail-
ability tool in non-abortion reproductive health cases as well.
For example, in a recent case involving pharmacists who
wanted the right to refuse to provide contraception to women,
both the district and appellate court weighed women's health
against other asserted interests, including freedom of reli-
gion. 69 In that case, courts used the perceived availability of
reproductive health services to recast women's health as a non-
constitutional "convenience" interest, a tactic analogous to the
sublimation of women's health to state interests in Casey's un-
due burden analysis. 70
Examining individual reproductive health cases provides a
window into how the availability tool functions. Decisions
show that references to availability appear in two primary
forms: courts cite the presence of competing reproductive
health providers and procedures as counteracting the potential
health risks posed by restrictions on reproductive health care.
B. The Availability of Alternative Providers
When a law impacts the number of reproductive health
service providers, judges can use the availability tool to deter-
mine whether that law burdens women's health. For example,
in a hypothetical case where a judge must analyze the constitu-
tionality of a law banning midwives from performing abortions,
a judge perfunctorily applying the availability tool might cite
the general availability of competing providers, such as physi-
cians, to show that the ban on midwife providers will not have
a deleterious impact on women's health. A more nuanced ap-
plication of the availability tool could find that such a ban could
threaten the health of certain women, namely rural women
served primarily by midwives due to a lack of available obste-
tricians. The extent to which alternative providers are avail-
able and thus adequately protect women's health is at issue in
contraception- and abortion-related cases applying the avail-
ability tool. Whether related to pregnancy prevention or ter-
mination, these cases show that accurate identification of
available alternative providers determines whether the avail-
69. See generally infra Parts II.B-C.
70. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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ability tool functions to undercut women's health or to protect
it.
1. Contraception
Generally speaking, contraception is a reproductive health
product that enjoys robust availability, both in terms of provid-
ers willing to dispense it (whether by prescription or over-the-
counter) and the range of contraception options.71 The variety
of contraception options likely reflects widespread support for
this particular reproductive health technology. 72  Support for
contraception is not universal, however. This is particularly
the case with emergency contraception, 73 post-intercourse con-
traception used either when pre-intercourse contraception is
not used or when it fails. 74
71. The U.S. hormonal contraceptives market, including oral contraceptives
and hormonal IUDs, is valued at approximately $2.5 billion annually. See Aude
Lagorce, Schering AG Storms Birth Control Market, FORBES, July 11, 2003,
http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/11/cxad 0710shr.html. U.S. condom sales are
expected to top $444 million annually by 2010. See Calie LaFevre, Spray-On
Condoms: Still a Hard Sell, TIME, Aug. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/timelbusiness/article/0,8599,1832445,00.html.
72. See Press Release, Harris Interactive, Large Majorities Support More
Access to Birth Control Information, and Agree that it is a Good Way to Prevent
Abortions (June 22, 2006), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NEWS/allnews
bydate.asp?NewslD=1064 (finding 73 percent of poll respondents think contracep-
tion access should not be limited by a person's ability to pay for it, and 89 percent
think more information on contraception should be available to adults).
73. Emergency contraception is often referred to as "the morning after pill."
See id. Regular prescription hormonal contraceptives can be used post-
intercourse as emergency contraception. Planned Parenthood, Emergency Con-
traception (Morning After Pill), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-
topics/emergency-contraception-morning-after-pill-4363.htm (follow "How Do I
Use Emergency Contraception?" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (listing
more than twenty pills that can be used as emergency contraception). Common
brand-name emergency contraceptives include Plan B and Plan B OneStep. See
Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Plan B One-Step Consumer: What is Plan B One-
Step?, http://www.planbonestep.com/what-is-plan-b.aspx (last visited Sept. 27,
2009). Although Plan B is a brand name, it is also sometimes used colloquially as
a general descriptor for all post-intercourse contraception.
74. See Press Release, Harris Interactive, supra note 72 (finding that only 58
percent of respondents think emergency contraception should be "easily avail-
able," but also finding that only 62 percent think pharmacists should not be al-
lowed to refuse to dispense it). Contraceptive-related controversies have not been
confined to only Plan B, however. Traditional oral contraceptives have also been
the subject of pharmacist refusal. See CRISTINA PAGE, HOW THE PRO-CHOICE
MOVEMENT SAVED AMERICA: FREEDOM, POLITICS AND THE WAR ON SEX 1-2 (2006)
(retelling the stories of several women who were refused contraceptives at phar-
macies across the country).
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According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Plan
B, perhaps the most well-known form of emergency contracep-
tion,
works like a birth control pill to prevent pregnancy mainly
by stopping the release of an egg from the ovary. It is possi-
ble that Plan B may also work by preventing fertilization of
an egg (the uniting of sperm with the egg) or by preventing
attachment (implantation) to the uterus (womb), which
usually occurs beginning 7 days after release of an egg from
the ovary. Plan B will not do anything to a fertilized egg
already attached to the uterus. The pregnancy will
continue.75
Given that emergency contraception such as Plan B functions
by interrupting a biological sequence of events, it is crucial that
it be taken as soon as possible after intercourse. 76 Plan B may
be available from a variety of sources, including pharmacies,
where it is kept behind the counter. No prescription is neces-
sary for women ages seventeen and over, but a prescription is
necessary for women sixteen and younger. 77 By one account,
Plan B is responsible for almost half of the decline in the num-
ber of abortions between 1994 and 2000.78
Some pharmacists believe that emergency contraception
such as Plan B functions as an abortifacient, rather than a con-
75. See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Plan B: Questions and Answers (Dec. 14,
2006), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetylnformation
forPatientsandProviders/ucm109783.htm.
76. See id. ("Data shows Plan B is more effective the sooner treatment is
started following unprotected sex."); PAGE, supra note 74, at 99-100 (noting that
the chance of pregnancy if taken within 24 hours of intercourse is 0.4 percent, and
the likelihood increases to 2.7 percent if taken between 24 and 72 hours after
intercourse).
77. In 2009, a federal court ordered the FDA to permit pharmaceutical com-
panies to make Plan B available without a prescription to 17-year-old young
women. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Subse-
quently, multiple formulations of Plan B (as well as a generic version) were ap-
proved for over-the-counter use by women ages 17 and older. U.S. Food and Drug
Admin., FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Emergency Contraceptive; Lowers Age
for Obtaining Two-Dose Plan B Emergency Contraceptive without a Prescription
(July 16, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafety
InformationforPatientsandProviders/UCM109775; Press Release, Watson Phar-
maceuticals, Inc., Watson Pharmaceuticals Receives FDA Approval For Generic
Plan B for Over-the-Counter Use (Aug. 28, 2009), http://ir.watson.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=65778&p=RssLanding&cat=news&id=1325502.
78. See Rachel K. Jones et al., Contraceptive Use Among U.S. Women Having
Abortions in 2000-2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 226 (2002),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3429402.pdf (discussing the
decline between 1994 and 2000).
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traceptive and therefore refuse to dispense emergency contra-
ception, saying that it violates their religious or personal be-
liefs. 79 Many women, on the other hand, argue that such re-
fusal jeopardizes their ability to use the drug in a timely
manner, thus diminishing their chance to prevent an un-
planned pregnancy.80 Pharmacist refusal has sparked heated
reactions on both sides of the debate, prompting several states
(and pharmacy boards) to confront the issue: some protect
pharmacists' ability to refuse and others limit it.8l Although
pharmacist refusal has the potential to impact women's health,
litigation over pharmacist refusal tends to focus on the conflict
between an employer and the religious rights of a pharmacist.82
Access to emergency contraception and its relative impact
on women's health was squarely before a court, however, in one
recent case. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky was brought by phar-
macists and a pharmacy in an effort to stop the enforcement of
79. An abortifacient is a substance that causes pregnancy to end prematurely
and causes an abortion. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2003). One group of pharmacists who opposes abortion and describes Plan B as
an abortifacient is Pharmacists for Life International. See generally Pharmacists
for Life International, Plan B [Emergency Abortion Pill] FAQs,
http://www.pfli.org/main.php?pfli=planbfaq (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). See also
Rob Stein, New Rule Protects Health Care Workers 'Right of Conscience, WASH.
POST, Dec. 19, 2008, at A10 (asserting that religious-based refusal to provide vari-
ous health care services is on the increase); Rob Stein, 'Pro-Life' Drugstores Mar-
ket Beliefs, WASH. PosT, June 16, 2008, at Al (discussing the opening of pro-life
drug stores, which do not stock contraceptives). For purposes of this Article, I
focus on pharmacist refusal; however, other pharmacy workers may also refuse to
participate in work they find objectionable.
80. For more information, see National Women's Law Center, The Pharmacy
Refusal Project, http://www.nwlc.org/details.cfm?id=2185&section=health (last
visited Feb. 9, 2009) (detailing the pharmacist refusal issue and providing instruc-
tions to women who have been refused).
81. See National Women's Law Center, Pharmacy Refusals: State Laws, Reg-
ulations, and Policies (July 2009), http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/pharmacyrefusal
policiesjuly2009.pdf (describing pharmacist refusal laws by state).
82. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
[hereinafter Stormans 1], appears to be unique because of the presence of the
women intervenors, who pressed women's health as an issue requiring court at-
tention. Cf. Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 F. Supp. 2d 992 (C.D. Ill. 2006) (examin-
ing whether an Illinois law which limited pharmacist refusal violated pharmac-
ists' rights); Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, 232 Fed. App'x 581 (7th Cir. 2007)
(dismissing action by refusing pharmacist under Title VII). In administrative ac-
tions brought against pharmacists, however, women's health may be considered.
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Neil T. Noesen, RPH, Proposed
Final Decision and Order, Case No. LSO310091PHM, at 7, 19 (Wis. Pharmacy Ex-
amining Bd. Feb. 2005), available at http://www.naralwi.org/assets/files/noesen
decision&finalorder.pdf (recommending discipline of a pharmacist who refused to
fill or to transfer oral contraceptives, and noting that "[elvery pregnancy has the
potential for morbidity or mortality").
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Washington state regulations that restrict pharmacists' ability
to refuse to dispense Plan B due to their religious or moral ob-
jections. 83 The Washington regulations forbade pharmacists
from discriminating against patients, destroying or refusing to
return prescriptions, violating patient privacy, or harassing or
intimidating customers, and put the burden on the pharmacy
to protect customers from refusal by ensuring that all custom-
ers have access to medication even if a pharmacist refused. 84
Washington sought to restrict pharmacist refusal in the in-
terest of "promoting [women's] health by ensuring access to
Plan B."85
Stormans generated multiple opinions. The courts used
the availability tool in every decision, and, in every decision,
the tool truncated the women's health analysis to some de-
gree. 86 In Stormans I, a group of women-some of whom had
been refused Plan B by pharmacists previously-intervened in
an attempt to ensure that the regulations were enforced, thus
protecting their ability to obtain emergency contraception. 87
The women intervenors were unsuccessful: the district court
granted a preliminary injunction to the pharmacists pending a
full trial on the basis that the regulation could violate the
pharmacists' free religious exercise right, in effect permitting
some pharmacist refusal.88 In so doing, the court misapplied
the availability tool by failing to fully analyze whether the
alternative providers they cited were true substitutes for the
refusing pharmacists. The women seeking access to emergency
83. Stormans I, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1248-49.
84. Id. at 1251-53.
85. See id. at 1263 (asserting a secondary interest of "preventing sex
discrimination").
86. See infra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
87. In addition to HIV-medication-related intervenors, five women who were
concerned with pharmacist refusal as it pertained to Plan B intervened: one
woman who faced a hostile pharmacist at a pharmacy that did not carry Plan B,
was referred to another store but given no directions to it, and had to cut a trip
short to return home to a known pharmacy; one woman who was refused by a
pharmacist, but another pharmacist at the same pharmacy provided the Plan B;
one woman who used Plan B twice--once after a sexual assault-and both times
got it from Planned Parenthood because she had heard stories of pharmacist re-
fusals elsewhere; one woman who did not use Plan B, but found two out of five lo-
cal pharmacies unwilling to provide it; and one woman who participated in the
suit because she agreed with its goals. See Stormans I, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1254-
55; see also Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 526 F.3d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 2008) [hereinaf-
ter Stormans II] (discussing the "most serious" intervenor cases as those in which
there was a pharmacist refusal, but noting that both women were able to get Plan
B ultimately).
88. Stormans I, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
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contraception lost again in Stormans II, when the appellate
court declined to stay the district court injunction, thereby
ostensibly permitting some pharmacist refusal pending ap-
peal. 89 The court relied heavily on the Stormans I rationale,
again misapplying the availability tool.90 The women interve-
nors prevailed in Stormans III, however, when the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the order granting the preliminary injunction, va-
cated the injunction, and remanded the matter to the district
court for further proceedings.9' The holding did not center on
women's health: the court found that the district court applied
the wrong legal standard and that the resultant injunction in
the pharmacists' and pharmacy's favor was overbroad. 92 The
Ninth Circuit did, however, discuss women's health. It cited
the potential harm to women posed by delayed access to Plan
B. 93 Here, too, the court applied the availability tool, actually
identifying deficiencies in the prior courts' application, but
then, quite inexplicably, made similar missteps in its own use
of the tool. 94 At all levels of litigation, the Stormans contro-
versy is illustrative of the problems inherent in the availability
tool.
Stormans I and II are particularly emblematic of the
availability tool's potential pitfalls, as both misapply the tool
and in so doing negate the health interests of both the individ-
ual women intervenors and Washington women generally.
First, according to Stormans I and II, the intervening women
failed to demonstrate that women's health was threatened by
pharmacist refusal because all of the women who attempted to
get Plan B eventually were successful in procuring the drug.95
Presumably, these particular women neither became pregnant
89. Stormans II, 526 F.3d at 408.
90. Id.
91. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, Nos. 07-36039, 07-36040, 2009 WL 3448435, at
*27 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Stormans Ill] (holding that the district
court applied the incorrect standard of review, failed to balance hardships, and
failed to consider the public interest). Stormans III vacated and superseded a
previous Ninth Circuit decision, but the analysis most relevant to women's health
largely stayed the same. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960 (9th Cir.
2009).
92. Stormans III, 2009 WL 3448435, at *27.
93. Id. at *24.
94. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
95. "There is no evidence that any woman who sought Plan B was unable to
obtain it." Stormans II, 526 F.3d at 409. The district court said that, at trial, it
wanted the parties to address whether there were patients who "failed to access
Plan B" due to the conduct of pharmacists who refused to provide access to Plan
B. Stormans I, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1266-67 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
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because of any delay in receiving contraception nor did they
suffer other health effects from the refusal they had already
suffered. Therefore, via the availability tool, both decisions
implied that the present controversy did not implicate these
individual women's health and that the presence of multiple
providers would protect the women from any future health is-
sues caused by pharmacist refusal.96 Thus, application of the
availability tool effectively truncated a more in-depth analysis
of the potential health implications presented by delayed or
denied access to the drug (including pregnancy). Second, the
courts in both Stormans I and I used the availability tool to
negate pharmacist refusals' potential to harm to all Washing-
ton women. Both decisions cited statistics on pharmacy avail-
ability to demonstrate, ostensibly, that no woman in the state
of Washington faced a health risk from pharmacist refusal: the
courts implied that the sheer number of pharmacies that
stocked Plan B prevented the health risks posed by pharmacist
refusal from coming to fruition.97 According to these courts, a
survey showed that out of 121 pharmacies that responded to a
survey, ninety-three "typically" stocked emergency contracep-
tives while twenty-eight did not.98 Despite the fact that the
survey showed that nearly one in four Washington pharmacies
did not stock Plan B, the courts cited the survey ostensibly to
96. Neither court considered the fact that the ability to access Plan B from
alternative providers in the past does not guarantee the ability to access it in the
future, nor does a previous physical harm-free delay in getting Plan B guarantee a
harm-free delay in the future. For a further discussion of the potential errors in
use of the availability tool in Stormans, see infra Part IV.
97. Stormans II, 526 F.3d at 408-09; Stormans I, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1260
("[A]s to Plan B, there has been no evidence presented to the Court that access is
a problem. It is available at all but a few licensed pharmacies in Washington
state and can be accessed through physicians' offices, certain government health
centers, hospital emergency rooms, Planned Parenthood and the internet.").
Interestingly, although the court cites the internet as one source for Plan B, the
Food and Drug Administration warns against purchasing drugs from the internet.
See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., The Possible Dangers of Buying Medicines Over
the Internet (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/Consumer
Updates/ucm048396.htm.
98. Stormans I, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1260 ("A survey of approximately 135
pharmacies conducted by the Board during the rulemaking process (October 2006)
revealed that of the 121 re-spondents, 93 typically stocked emergency contracep-
tives while 28 did not. Of those who did not, 18 cited low demand and three relied
on an 'easy alternative source.' Only two pharmacies said they did not stock
emergency contraceptives because of religious or personal reasons."); see also
Stormans II, 526 F.3d at 408.
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show the adequate availability of Plan B and failed to ade-
quately discuss the risks delayed access may present. 99
In Stormans I and II, the statistics cited indicated which
pharmacies stocked Plan B, not the willingness of individual
pharmacists at those pharmacies to dispense it. This is a cru-
cial distinction: one of the plaintiff pharmacists in Stormans
who was seeking the right to refuse to dispense Plan B was the
sole pharmacist at a pharmacy that apparently stocked the
contraceptive.100 This fact scenario shows that, although a
pharmacy stocks Plan B, it may not necessarily have a phar-
macist willing to provide it or transfer it to someone who
will.101 Therefore, although the availability tool was used, the
availability cited-pharmacies stocking Plan B-did not show
that women's health in the state of Washington was
protected.102
According to the courts, women's health was not truly at
issue in Stormans I and II: the women's interest was simply
that they "understandably may not want to drive farther than
the closest pharmacy" to get Plan B. 103 By recasting the
women's interest as one that "ha[d] more to do with con-
venience and heartfelt feelings than with actual access to cer-
tain medications," 104 the courts rendered unnecessary any
meaningful analysis of the potential health implications posed
99. Stormans II, 526 F.3d at 408-09; Stormans I, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
100. See Stormans I, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1253-54 (noting that the pharmacy
could not afford to hire a second pharmacist, thereby implying that the refusing
pharmacist had been working-and presumably refusing to provide Plan B-alone
at this pharmacy).
101. Pharmacist Neil Noesen, in another case, refused to transfer contracep-
tive prescriptions to competing pharmacies, rendering the availability of alterna-
tive providers meaningless to the women he served. In re Disciplinary Proceed-
ings Against Neil T. Noesen, RPH, Case No. LSO310091PHM, at 19 (Wis.
Pharmacy Examining Bd. Feb. 2005), available at http://www.naralwi.org/
assets/files/noesendecision&finalorder.pdf.
102. See infra Part IV (discussing the various concerns raised by the avail-
ability tool).
103. See Stormans I, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
104. See id. To the contrary, the appellate dissent sets up a direct confronta-
tion between women's health and the religious interests of pharmacists who don't
want to provide access to contraceptives, specifically characterizing the potential
delay in receiving Plan B as a health risk: "unwanted pregnancies and all that ac-
companies it." Stormans II, 526 F.3d at 410-17 (Tashima, J., dissenting in part)
(focusing not on the ultimate ability of the individual women to successfully get
Plan B, but instead on the delay and concomitant health risks that each woman
faced).
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by pharmacist refusal. 105 It also placed women in a classic
double bind: in order to have a cause of action, women must
have "failed" to access Plan B altogether, but given that access
is a matter of "convenience," if a woman had failed to access
Plan B, she would have been culpable for her failure to find a
provider.106 By emphasizing the purported availability of al-
ternative Plan B providers, both courts negated the health con-
cerns posed by the intervening women, who had previously
been refused Plan B, ultimately finding that there was no
showing that intervenors would face irreparable harm if the in-
junction remained in effect pending appeal. 0 7
The application of the availability tool in Stormans I and II
shortchanged women's reproductive health individually, as
to the intervenors, and collectively, as to Washington State
women. The appeal of the injunction-heard in Stormans III-
would show both the promise of the availability tool and its
pitfalls.
In Stormans III, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's injunction and ruled in the women intervenors' favor.
In doing so, it questioned the superficial inculcation of avail-
ability by prior courts, but then itself proceeded to misapply
the availability tool.108 Stormans III noted the sparse record
relied on by prior courts, and said that the survey relied upon
in the prior decisions only provided information on whether
pharmacies stocked Plan B and provided no information on
whether providers would dispense it.109 But after what appears
to be a recognition of the availability tool's pitfalls, Stormans
III made a classic misapplication of the tool. In its analysis of
whether the district court injunction that applied to all phar-
macists and pharmacies was overbroad, the court said that a
narrower injunction allowing only the plaintiff pharmacy and
105. Compare Stormans II, 526 F.3d at 408-09 (citing with approval the dis-
trict court discussion of Plan B's "72-hour window of effectiveness" but failing to
analyze the drug's declining efficacy after twenty-four hours), with Stormans II,
526 F.3d at 416-17 (Tashima, J., dissenting in part) (describing the potential for
unwanted pregnancies due to delayed access to Plan B).
106. See Stormans I, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1266-67 (asking parties to provide in-
formation on "patients who have failed" to get Plan B, thus implying culpability
on the women's part); MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY 8-10 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the significance of identifying double
binds); see also infra Part III (discussing the culpability tool).
107. See Stormans II, 526 F.3d at 408; Stormans 1, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1266-67.
108. See Stormans III, Nos. 07-36039, 07-36040, 2009 WL 3448435, at *2, *26
(9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2009).
109. Id. at *2, *21.
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pharmacists to refuse would not harm women because of the
availability of "numerous alternative pharmacies," doing so
without adequately examining whether those alternative
pharmacies staffed pharmacists willing to dispense Plan B,
were open comparable hours, or accepted comparable health
insurance. 110 The Stormans III court uses the availability of
theoretical alternatives as a proxy for a thorough examination
of women's health interests-the same type of error committed
by the Stormans I and II courts. Although Stormans III
ostensibly protected women's health by reversing the lower
court decision, its incomplete application of the availability tool
arguably paves the way for similar analytical missteps by the
district court on remand.
The Stormans litigation is a prime example of how the
availability tool operates in modern reproductive rights cases.
As will be discussed more thoroughly below, Stormans demon-
strates the attention to detail necessary to appropriately ana-
lyze potential substitutions for a threatened service and how
such detail may be neglected. Perhaps most significantly, the
most recent chapter in the case-Stormans III-shows the al-
lure of the availability tool, even to jurists who recognize that it
is not a panacea when evaluating women's reproductive health
controversies.
2. Abortion
The availability tool, and, more specifically, reference to
multiple providers, is not unique to pharmacist refusal: the tool
is also used in abortion cases where provider availability is
threatened by a law. In these cases, the availability of alterna-
tive providers may be cited to signal that a regulation is not an
unconstitutional burden on a woman's ability to access abortion
services and, by implication, is not an impermissible burden on
women's health. 111
110. See id.at*26.
111. In 2005, 87 percent of U.S. counties did not have an abortion provider. See
Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Ser-
vices, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 10 (2008). The number of
providers for later gestation abortion appears to be declining. See id. at 15. How-
ever, one group of economists has argued that the presence of competing abortion
providers allows women to "shop among providers for a price and quality combi-
nation that meets their preferences." Bonnie J. Kay et al., An Economic Interpre-
tation of the Distribution and Organization of Abortion Services, 18 INQUIRY 322,
324 (1981).
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The availability tool is not used in all abortion-related
cases, but when a law threatens to decrease the number of pro-
viders, the use of the availability tool may emerge. 112 In these
cases, the exit of a provider from the market is, according to
abortion rights advocates, an undue burden on women, who
would have to travel greater distances to obtain abortion ser-
vices and overcome the resultant increased costs, delay, and
health risks. 113 Some courts have held, however, that such
travel is not an undue burden on women and that the existence
of multiple abortion providers, even if not geographically con-
venient, protects women's right to access abortion. 114 In these
cases, access to competing providers may impliedly guarantee
not only the right to have an abortion but women's health
itself.
The significance of the availability tool in abortion provider
cases is apparent, for example, in Greenville Women's Clinic v.
Bryant, where both the district and appellate courts grappled
with whether the presence of multiple providers impacted the
constitutionality of abortion restrictions and came to decidedly
different results. 115  The regulations at issue in Greenville
Women's Clinic were extensive, mandating detailed record-
keeping by abortion providers, regulating facility construction,
112. See, e.g., Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 604-05 (6th
Cir. 2006) (holding that an abortion facility's likely closure stemming from regula-
tory requirements did not constitute an "undue burden" because women could
travel to other abortion providers in the region); Greenville Women's Health
Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 170 (4th Cir. 2000) (saying that administrative
regulations that may force one abortion provider to close would not pose an "un-
due burden" because women could travel seventy miles to an alternative pro-
vider). But see Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974 (1997) (explaining in
dicta that, even after upholding an abortion-related regulation, women would not
be "required ... to travel to a different facility than was previously available" and
therefore implying that a regulation forcing travel may constitute a burden of
some unspecified degree).
113. For an example of these arguments and how they were received by one
court, see Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d 691, 735 (D.S.C.
1999) (holding that increased cost, delay or distance to an abortion provider each
constitutes an "undue burden"), rev'd, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000).
114. See Women's Med. Prof'1 Corp., 438 F.3d at 604-05 (citing the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits for the proposition that increased travel is not an "undue burden"
but acknowledging Supreme Court dicta that could be read to suggest otherwise).
115. Compare Greenville Women's Clinic, 222 F.3d at 160 (restricting the ap-
plicability of the regulations to facilities where five or more first-trimester abor-
tions were performed per month), with Greenville Women's Clinic, 66 F. Supp. 2d
at 735 (holding that increased cost, delay or distance to an abortion provider each
constitutes an "undue burden").
2010] 123
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
and imposing onerous building requirements.116 Implementing
these types of regulations increases provider costs, which in
turn can lead to increased costs (and concomitant delay while
raising the funds) for patients. Closure of a provider may re-
sult. Such was the case in Greenville Women's Clinic.117
Greenville Women's Clinic demonstrates that the applica-
tion of the availability tool turns on how a court defines "avail-
able alternatives." Although the district and appellate courts
in this case came to opposite decisions on whether the regula-
tions at issue posed an undue burden on women, both used the
availability tool to arrive at their result. The district court
cited a lack of competing abortion providers in a specific geo-
graphic area to demonstrate that access to abortion services
would be inadequate to protect women's health if the regula-
tions were upheld." 8 The appellate court held a contrary view
of availability: the appellate court cited what it saw as the
presence of competing providers as proof that the law would
not impact women's health. 119
The district court opinion made women's health the central
issue throughout the analysis, including in its evocation of
availability.120 The court used the availability tool, ultimately
finding that, if the law was allowed to stand, thus forcing a
provider to close, the lack of available alternative providers in
certain areas of the state would jeopardize women's health. 12 1
Its decision centered on the Roe-based premise that the regula-
tions at issue must protect maternal health in order to pass
116. Greenville Women's Clinic, 222 F.3d at 160-62 (describing a ten-part regu-
latory scheme). These regulations are described as TRAP laws, or targeted regu-
lations of abortion providers, by abortion rights organizations. See Center for
Reproductive Rights, Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP): Avoiding
the TRAP (Nov. 1, 2007), http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/targeted-
regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap-avoiding-the-trap.
117. See Greenville Women's Clinic, 222 F.3d at 162 (describing the impact on
abortion cost to be between $23 and $368 per procedure, depending on the pro-
vider and whether it decided to remain open).
118. See Greenville Women's Clinic, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 720 (saying that regula-
tors failed to assess whether the increased cost of abortion would have an adverse
impact on the availability of abortion services in the state).
119. See Greenville Women's Clinic, 222 F.3d at 170 (noting that competition
protected women typically served by the clinic to be closed and that evidence was
not presented to support the notion that increased cost alone would be unduly
burdensome).
120. See Greenville Women's Clinic, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 731.
121. See id. at 735-36 (noting the foreseeable closure of an abortion clinic and
finding that increasing the distance a woman has to travel to obtain an abortion
constitutes a substantial obstacle).
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constitutional scrutiny.122  The district court compared the
health risks of abortion and the health risks of pregnancy, not-
ing that early abortion has a mortality rate twenty-five times
lower than carrying a pregnancy to term.123 The discussion of
the relative risks of abortion and pregnancy is significant be-
cause it frames the opinion as one that concerns women's
health, not only the right to access abortion services. In other
words, the opinion resists the conflated analysis invited by
Casey.
The district court decision marched through an analysis of
the increased costs the regulations would prompt, ultimately
finding that such increases threatened women's health. The
regulations would force physicians to impose fee increases
ranging from a nominal additional cost to an increase of almost
$400 per procedure.124 The district court said that these costs
would likely force one provider out of business, and the alterna-
tive of asking women to travel more than seventy miles to
another provider was insufficient either to protect their right to
access abortion services or to protect their health. 125 Delay in
accessing abortion is a health risk, and regulations that in-
crease costs or drive providers out of business cause delay.126
This, according to the district court, is why the regulations at
issue constituted an undue burden for South Carolina women
seeking an abortion. 127 In other words, the presence of distant
122. See id. at 725-31 (citing Casey's requirement that abortion regulations
should protect women's health and calling the regulations "at best medically un-
necessary and at worst contrary to accepted medical practice").
123. See id. at 705 (citing a total complication rate of 1 in 100; serious compli-
cations requiring hospitalization as 1 in 2,000; and mortality as 1 in 100,000 for
suction curettage abortion).
124. See id. at 717 (describing the cost increases in dollar amount ranges by
facility, with the highest increase being so extreme that the provider anticipated
it would force closure).
125. See id. at 735 (noting that the decreased availability of abortion services
due to the closure of one provider would constitute a substantial burden to
women); see also Kay et al., supra note 111, at 324 (noting that abortion services
are unevenly distributed and that the vast majority of all unmet abortion needs
are concentrated in rural areas).
126. See Greenville Women's Clinic, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 720 ("This increase in the
cost of abortion services will delay a significant number of women from obtaining
the procedure and, in some cases, result in their inability to obtain the procedure.
As a pregnancy advances, the medical risks associated with abortion increase, and
a full term pregnancy and childbirth is much more risky to the physical health of
a woman than a first trimester abortion.").
127. See id. (explaining that "by imposing additional costs and impediments to
women seeking abortions, the regulation may have the unintended effect of in-
creasing the risk of adverse health conditions").
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providers did not constitute adequate availability of alterna-
tives. Although distant providers were able to provide substi-
tute services, the inevitable delay arising from their distance
posed other health risks, thus preventing such providers from
being characterized as adequate substitutes for the provider
facing closure.
In the eyes of the appellate court, however, the loss of an
abortion provider was a permissible by-product of the law: "no
evidence suggests that [women] could not go to the clinic in
Charleston, some seventy miles away."1 28 The presence of
what the appellate court saw as alternative providers filled the
gap that might be created by the potential loss of providers due
to increased, regulatorily imposed costs. 129 Moreover, to the
appellate court, the increased costs were also "speculative" and
"modest."1 30 There was no substantive discussion of the impact
that increased costs and potential delays would have on acces-
sing abortion services or, ultimately, on women's health in the
relevant community. 131 Therefore, according to the appellate
court, the impact on women's health, if any, was speculative.132
Greenville Women's Clinic is a significant case when ex-
amining the availability tool because (1) it demonstrates the re-
liance on the availability tool by two courts deciding the same
question that came to entirely different results regarding the
constitutionality of abortion restrictions, and (2) it confirms the
significance of judicial characterization of available alterna-
128. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 165 (4th Cir. 2000).
The court repeated this statement, at no time fully addressing the health issues
raised by the district court. Id. at 170 (saying that while the regulations may
make securing an abortion "more difficult," they did not constitute an "undue bur-
den" (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992))).
The dissent said sending women to an abortion provider seventy miles away was
inadequate to protect women's right to access abortion services or their health.
Id. at 202 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority's treatment of
rural women as "with cavil"). See also Kay et al., supra note 111, at 330 (noting
that travel distance is negatively correlated with the use of abortion services).
129. We will see later, in the context of vaginal births after prior cesarean sec-
tion, that courts may cite the unavailability of a service-specifically providers
willing to supervise vaginal births after cesarean sections ("VBACs")-as evidence
that there is no provider for a reproductive health service because the service is
unsafe. See infra Part III (discussing court-ordered cesarean sections).
130. 222 F.3d at 159. From the outset of the appellate opinion, the pertinent
issues were framed much differently by the appellate court, which did not em-
phasize women's health, but instead focused on the impact the regulations would
have on women's "decisions to obtain an abortion." Id. at 162.
131. The court blamed the lack of analysis on the Plantiffs' use of a facial chal-
lenge to the law instead of a "concrete" challenge. See id. at 165-71.
132. Id.
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tives. 133 First, unlike autonomy-based arguments, which are
used by abortion rights advocates, or fetal life arguments,
which are only useful to abortion rights opponents, Greenville
Women's Clinic shows that the availability tool is hypotheti-
cally useful to both sides in reproductive health cases. The
availability tool crosses abortion's moral and political divides.
Second, as did the courts in Stormans, Greenville Women's
Clinic demonstrates that how a court defines "available alter-
native" may prove outcome-determinative when the availability
tool is used. The relevant portion of the Stormans analysis fo-
cused on pharmacies that stocked Plan B as available alterna-
tives instead of focusing on pharmacies with willing dispensers
of Plan B. 134 Likewise, in Greenville Women's Clinic, whether
the tool was applied neutrally or as a means to an end, each
decision turned in part on whether the court characterized a
provider located more than seventy miles away as an "avail-
able" alternative provider. 135
Provider-based applications of the availability tool are not
the tool's only use. In recent years, cases involving the pro-
posed abolishment of particular reproductive health procedures
have risen in jurisprudential profile. Specifically, debate over
so-called "partial-birth" abortion has been omnipresent in re-
productive rights jurisprudence. 136 In these cases, the avail-
ability of multiple providers is of no consequence, as it is alle-
gedly a single procedure that is at issue. The availability tool,
however, is still used. As is discussed below, the availability
tool's focus merely shifts to the presence of alternative proce-
dures to resolve any potential impact on women's health.
C. The Availability of Alternative Procedures
Judges may rely on the presence of available procedures
when using the availability tool, just as they rely on the pres-
133. See supra notes 115-32 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Part II.B(1).
135. See supra notes 115-32 and accompanying text.
136. Compare NARAL Pro-Choice America, Fast Facts: Abortion Bans After 12
Weeks, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/choice-action-center/in-your state/who-
decides/fast-facts/abortion-bans-after- 12-weeks.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2009)
(detailing state and federal second-trimester abortion bans), with National Right
to Life, Archives on Partial Birth Abortion, http://www.nrlc.org/ABORTION/pbal
index.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2009) (containing an exhaustive documentation
of the "partial birth" abortion-related controversies).
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ence of available providers.137 If the availability tool is to be
used correctly in these circumstances, a call for the elimination
of a particular reproductive health procedure should first lead
a court to determine whether there is an alternative procedure
available that would be an adequate substitute for the proce-
dure impacted by the law in question. 138 Identifying a true,
available alternative procedure, however, requires a second
step: courts must examine whether the potential substitute
provides not only the same service as the potentially banned
procedure, but also has an equivalent (or better) health risk-
and-benefit profile. Not all judges applying the availability tool
take this second step, which can lead to the undervaluing of
women's health in reproductive health controversies.
"Partial-birth" abortion bans provide fertile ground for the
application of the procedure-based availability tool. "Partial-
birth" abortion is a descriptor used by the anti-abortion rights
movement that has been applied to a wide variety of abortion
procedures.139 These bans restrict the range of abortion proce-
dures available to pregnant women and, in so doing, raise
questions regarding both access to abortion services and the
corollary impact that procedure unavailability may have on
women's health.
An examination of two Supreme Court cases involving par-
tial-birth abortion demonstrates that the use of the availability
tool in procedure-ban cases is not outcome determinative-far
from it. The resolution of each case turned in significant part
137. Procedure bans are less common than other forms of abortion regulation,
but as the "partial-birth" abortion litigation demonstrates, arise nonetheless. Pre-
Casey, in 1976, the Supreme Court struck down a ban on the saline amniocentesis
method of abortion using the availability tool, citing the lack of an alternative
procedure. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79
(1976) (citing the prevalence of the banned technique, health-related limitations
on the use of alternatives, and the lack of trained providers). See also Planned
Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502, 513-14 (6th Cir. 2006) (ad-
dressing the "off-label" use of the medical abortion-inducing drug mifepristone
and noting "[t]he State does not point to any evidence which demonstrates that
there is an alternative abortion procedure which is available after seven weeks'
gestation which is as safe or safer than a mifepristone medical abortion for all
medically foreseeable circumstances or conditions").
138. See infra notes 139-78 and accompanying text (discussing the litigation
surrounding partial-birth abortion).
139. See generally Kenneth L. Woodword, What's in a Name? The New York
Times on "Partial-Birth Abortion", 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 427,
441 (2005) (discussing that "partial-birth" abortion is not a medically recognized
term for an official procedure, saying " '[p]artial birth' is a political battle cry, not
medical terminology" (quoting Frank Talk About Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2003, at WK8)).
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on the Court's characterization of whether there was an avail-
able alternative to partial-birth abortion that would allow the
ban at issue to survive constitutional scrutiny. In Stenberg v.
Carhart, a partial-birth abortion-related case, the Court ap-
plied the availability tool and ultimately found inadequate al-
ternative procedures to justify upholding the ban. 140 A more
recent case, Gonzales v. Carhart, upheld a similar partial-birth
abortion ban, citing the availability of adequate alternative
procedures. 141
Stenberg centered on a Nebraska statute criminalizing the
act of performing a partial-birth abortion. 142 Proponents of the
ban argued that the statute applied to a particular procedure,
called dilation and extraction ("D&X," also known as "intact
D&E"). 143 Some describe D&X as a procedure during which a
fetus is partially delivered, its skull collapsed, and the contents
removed. 144 A physician who provided abortion services chal-
lenged the vaguely worded ban, arguing that it prohibited not
only the less frequently used D&X procedure but also banned
dilation and evacuation ("D&E"), the most commonly used
abortion procedure, and a procedure typically used in early
pregnancy. 145 Moreover, whatever procedure the law banned,
it contained no exception for the health of the pregnant woman,
in apparent contravention of Roe's health-related mandates. 146
Signaling the coming use of the availability tool, Stenberg
began by describing the procedures available to terminate a
pregnancy and outlining the potential risks of each procedure.
In doing so, the decision quickly set forth procedures that may
serve as alternatives to D&X, both in terms of simple availabil-
ity and suitability based on each individual procedure's health-
risk profile. Approximately 90 percent of all abortions per-
formed in the United States are performed during the first tri-
140. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923-38 (2000).
141. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166-67 (2007) ("The Act is not
invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over whether the barred procedure
is ever necessary to preserve a woman's health, given the availability of other
abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.").
142. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921-22.
143. Id. at 922-27 (explaining that D&X procedures are also known by some as
intact D&E).
144. See id. at 927 (explaining that the fetus is not disarticulated in a "partial-
birth" abortion).
145. Id. at 922.
146. Id. at 937-38 (noting that medical uncertainty as to the procedure's rela-
tive utility shows that potential risk to women's health is present, thus requiring
a health exception).
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mester of pregnancy, and the predominant technique used is
vacuum aspiration. 147 Vacuum aspiration has an extremely
low rate of complications; its mortality rate, according to the
Court, is five to ten times lower than carrying a pregnancy to
term. 148 During the second trimester, D&E is used for between
ninety and 95 percent of all terminations, but this procedure
does carry certain health risks.149 D&X, on the other hand, is
also used during the second trimester, but the frequency of its
use is unknown.150 The benefits of D&X over other procedures
were disputed, but, according to some physicians, included
lower infection and organ perforation rates for the pregnant
woman and additional, specific benefits for women with certain
health conditions.151
The application of the availability tool in Stenberg (and
later in Gonzales) hinged on whether an alternative procedure
for partial-birth abortion was necessary and, if so, was avail-
able. Stenberg required any alternative to be at least as safe as
the procedure threatened, D&X.152 If no such procedure was
available, a health exception to the partial-birth abortion ban
was constitutionally mandated. 153
The availability tool eventually guided the Stenberg Court
to find that the existence of an acceptable alternative to D&X
was questionable-in other words, the medical evidence failed
to establish whether any other available procedure provided
the same service (termination of pregnancy) with the same or
less health risk to pregnant women. 154 The Court reviewed ex-
tensive medical evidence and concluded that D&X may pose
147. Id. at 923 (outlining the various procedures available for terminating
pregnancies along with frequency of use and potential health effects).
148. Id. (discussing the various abortion procedures used at various
gestations).
149. See id. at 923-27 (explaining that organ perforation, damage, and infec-
tion are potential complications from D&Es, but saying that complication rates for
D&E are less than induced labor, another abortion technique).
150. Id. at 929 (saying that estimates of D&X usage range from 640 to 5,000
procedures per year).
151. See id. at 927-29 (relating that women with prior uterine scarring or for
whom induction of labor may be particularly dangerous benefit from the availabil-
ity of D&X).
152. See id. at 934-38 (saying that D&X may be safer than alternatives so a
health exception is mandated).
153. Id.
154. See id. (citing medical authority stating that D&X may have health bene-
fits over other procedures). But see Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 873 (7th
Cir. 1999) (noting the application of the availability tool by Illinois and Wisconsin
which found that D&X was not necessary for the health of women "given the
availability of other procedures"), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).
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fewer risks to certain pregnant women desiring to terminate a
pregnancy than any alternative procedure.' 55  As it was
unclear whether an alternative procedure with the same or
better health benefits was available, a health exception was
required.156
The Stenberg health exception analysis provides an exam-
ple of how the availability tool can be used to appropriately
analyze women's health issues in reproductive rights jurispru-
dence. The Court undertook a comparison of D&X with avail-
able alternative procedures-a comparison that did not just
focus on women's continued ability to access abortion (which is
where many incorrect applications of the availability tool stop),
but also on their ability to do so as safely as they could have
prior to the ban. 157 Moreover, by acknowledging the fact that
the "division of medical opinion about the matter at most
means uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk,
not its absence," the Court's ultimate holding that a health ex-
ception was necessary to protect women showed that a proper
application of the availability tool is possible even in complex
factual scenarios where the health necessity of the banned pro-
cedure is in question 158 The Stenberg Court went on to hold
that the law also placed an "undue burden" on women's ability
to access abortion, given that it banned both D&X and D&E.159
As we will see later in Gonzales, which relied on a contrary ap-
plication of the availability tool, the Court's resolution of a sim-
ilar question of availability resulted in a truncated women's
health analysis.
155. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 935-36 (citing the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists statement that D&X may be safer than "available alter-
natives" for certain women).
156. Id. at 940; see also David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy
After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA. L. REV. 1125, 1161-62 (2001) (interpreting
the Stenberg v. Carhart majority opinion as prohibiting any state-imposed in-
creased medical risk to a woman seeking an abortion).
157. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 934-37.
158. See id. at 937; see also id. at 931 (noting that abortion regulations can
pose significant health risks to women, whether the risk originates from the regu-
lation of an abortion method or from the pregnancy itself).
159. Id. at 938 (application of the availability tool in this portion of the analy-
sis was unnecessary given Nebraska's stipulation that if the ban applied to first-
trimester procedures it would constitute an "undue burden"). However, Justice
O'Connor suggested an application of the availability tool in her undue burden
analysis: "If there were adequate alternative methods for a woman safely to ob-
tain an abortion before viability, it is unlikely that prohibiting the D&X procedure
alone would 'amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seek-
ing an abortion.'" Id. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parent-
hood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)).
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Stenberg did not stem the tide of partial-birth abortion leg-
islation: it simply sent ban proponents back to the legislative
drawing board with jurisprudential guidance as to what type of
legislation the Court was likely to find constitutionally accept-
able. 160 The Supreme Court addressed partial-birth abortion
again in 2007, this time as a federal partial-birth abortion ban.
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court considered a federal par-
tial-birth abortion ban challenge based on legal issues similar
to those in Stenberg: the ban lacked an exception to protect the
health of the pregnant woman, and it was unclear what proce-
dure or procedures the ban prohibited.161 To determine the le-
gal import of each of the issues, the Court again focused on
whether alternative procedures existed. Specifically, it relied
heavily on the availability of multiple second-trimester abor-
tion procedures when holding that the federal partial-birth
abortion ban was not an undue burden on women. 162 Gonzales
was the first case in more than three decades in which the Su-
preme Court upheld an abortion restriction without a corollary
health exception. 163
Gonzales typifies how a court that improperly applies the
availability tool can shortchange women's health. At the outset
of the Gonzales decision, the Court signaled that availability of
alternative procedures would be significant to its analysis. The
inclusion of available alternatives at this point in the decision
is not explained, just simply set forth. The Court juxtaposed a
graphic description of D&X with a description of abortion pro-
cedures that could potentially substitute for D&X 164 and the
160. See infra notes 161-78 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent
partial-birth abortion ban litigation).
161. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141-44 (2007).
162. See id. at 166-67 ("The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncer-
tainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman's
health, given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to
be safe alternatives."). The decision cites the presence of conflicting medical
opinions on the medical necessity of D&X to support its ultimate holding that al-
ternative abortion procedures vitiated any impact the ban could have on women's
health. See id. at 162-64.
163. See National Partnership for Women & Families, The Supreme Court and
Abortion Access (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/Doc
Server/supremecourtandabortion-access-aug_26 2008.pdf~doclD=3881 (saying
that the Gonzales Court abandoned the health exception requirement, which had
been in place for thirty-three years).
164. Id. at 134-40. The court refers to D&X as "intact D&E." See generally
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 136-37 (noting the different nomenclature used to describe
a partial-birth abortion). For the purpose of consistency, the term D&X is used
throughout this paper.
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commonality of each procedure. At this point in the decision,
the Court mentions generally and in passing the potential risks
to women's health from some alternatives. 165
The Gonzales Court immediately distinguished the federal
partial-birth abortion ban from the Nebraska ban in Stenberg,
finding that the federal ban was substantially narrower in
scope than the Nebraska ban. 166 The Court's different inter-
pretation of the scope of the bans in each of the two cases
directly impacts how the availability tool is used. Given the
federal ban's significantly narrower scope, the likelihood that
the federal procedure ban could be compensated for by the
presence of alternative procedures should have been greater.
As was the case in Stenberg, the Gonzales Court had to de-
termine whether the absence of a health exception rendered
the statute unconstitutional. The Gonzales Court noted the
same issue that faced it in Stenberg: although medical evidence
supporting the necessity of D&X existed, there was no medical
consensus regarding whether the availability of D&X was ne-
cessary to protect the health of women seeking an abortion. To
the contrary, the issue of whether D&X is the "safest" second-
trimester abortion method was hotly contested. 167 The Court
noted the "documented medical disagreement [over] whether
the Act's prohibition would ever impose significant health risks
on women."168 But it departed from its prior treatment of the
health exception issue: unlike Stenberg, where the Court re-
solved the question in favor of women's health, the Gonzales
Court conflated the resolution of the health exception issue
with the broader undue burden analysis permitted by Casey.169
The Gonzales Court then used the availability tool to resolve
both the health exception and undue burden issues
simultaneously.
165. See id. at 139-40 (describing alternative second-trimester abortion
methods as: medical induction, used in 5 percent of abortions prior to twenty
weeks gestation and 15 percent in those after twenty weeks; and hysterotomy and
hysterectomy, which together account for less than 0.1 percent of all second-
trimester abortions and are only used in emergency situations because of health
risks to the pregnant woman).
166. Id. at 150 (finding that the ban covered D&X, or "intact D&E," not "the
D&E procedure in which the fetus is removed in parts" and postulating that the
different diction in the federal ban was Congress' attempt to avoid Stenberg-like
issues).
167. See id. at 162-65.
168. Id. at 162.
169. See id. at 165-67 (conflating the necessity of a health exception with the
analysis of whether the ban was an undue burden on access).
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The Court held that the federal partial-birth abortion ban
did not constitute an "undue burden," even without an excep-
tion to protect the health of pregnant women, because the
Court found that available alternative abortion procedures
obviated any medical uncertainty as to the banned procedure's
necessity to women. 170  The Gonzales Court relied on the
continued availability of D&E and other alternate procedures,
saying, "[a]lternatives are available to the prohibited proce-
dure. . . . Here the Act allows, among other means, a common-
ly used and generally accepted method, so it does not construct
a substantial obstacle to the abortion right." 71 It then went on
to hold that a health exception was unnecessary, saying that
when
standard medical options are available, mere convenience
does not suffice to displace them; and if some procedures
have different risks than others, it does not follow that the
State is altogether barred from imposing reasonable regula-
tions. The Act is not invalid on its face where there is un-
certainty over whether the barred procedure is ever neces-
sary to preserve a woman's health, given the availability of
other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe
alternatives.172
The Gonzales Court misapplied the availability tool in a
predictable manner: it failed to adequately analyze whether the
substitute procedures-frequently used or not-had the same
or better health risk-benefit profile as the banned procedure for
women who might need it. The Gonzales Court cited medical
support for the argument that the banned procedure was ne-
cessary for the health of some women, 173 although it subse-
quently found that the presence of "safe alternatives" obviated
the ban's increased risks to women's health. 174 The use of
"safe" in lieu of "as safe," "safer," or "safest" effectively signaled
the Court's acceptance of laws that impose health risks on
170. Id. at 164-65 (distinguishing the case from Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), in which the Court struck down a ban on the
saline amniocentesis abortion method, which was then the most common second-
trimester abortion method).
171. Id. (noting court decisions that cite the relative safety of D&E and the
modification to the D&X procedure that could be made so as not to fall under the
federal ban).
172. Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 161-63.
174. Id. (holding the ban constitutional where there is uncertainty over its
necessity and there are "safe alternatives").
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women seeking abortion and overtly allowed substitutes with-
out defining the "fit" necessary. In response to the Court's de-
cision, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
released a statement calling the ruling "shameful and incom-
prehensible" and observing that " '[i]t leaves no doubt that
women's health in America is perceived as being of little
consequence.' "175
Noticeably absent from the Gonzales majority opinion is a
detailed, procedure-by-procedure comparison of women's health
risks and benefits as was presented in the dissent. 176 Rather
than discussing the comparative health risks and benefits of all
procedures, the majority assumes that the availability of
an alternative procedure protects women's health. The Court
apparently infers from the frequency with which the non-
banned procedures are used that, in the absence of the banned
procedure, the alleged alternatives will protect all women's
health.177 But frequency of use alone does not prove that the
asserted alternatives are as safe as the banned procedure for
women. Just as in the hypothetical diaphragm ban, where
women diaphragm users were told that oral contraceptives and
IUDs were "available alternatives" despite the fact that they
may be medically contraindicated for some women, Gonzales
erroneously defined "available alternatives" in terms of
women's continued ability to access abortion, instead of looking
for the safest "available alternatives" for all women's health.
Gonzales is an example of the misapplication of the avail-
ability tool and its potential to undercut women's health. The
case at once heralds the availability of safe alternatives to the
banned procedure while admitting that there is medical
authority suggesting that the ban could be harmful to women's
175. Press Release, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
("ACOG"), ACOG Statement on the US Supreme Court Decision Upholding the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.acog.org/
from home/publications/pressreleases/nr04-18-07.cfm (quoting Douglas W.
Laube, MD, MEd, ACOG president).
176. Compare Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 176-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting. Stevens,
Souter, & Breyer, JJ., joining) (providing detailed information on the population
of women for which the banned procedure may be safest and the safety advan-
tages) with id. at 161-67 (majority opinion) (acknowledging the potential benefits
of the banned procedure for some women, but focusing on the disagreement in the
medical community).
177. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164-65 (majority opinion) (distinguishing that
case from Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), in
which the Court struck down a ban on the saline amniocentesis abortion method,
which was then the most common second-trimester abortion method, and saying,
"[a]lternatives are available" to D&X).
2010] 135
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
health.178 It is a perplexing retreat from the more vigorous ap-
plication of the availability tool in Stenberg.
When one looks at judicial reliance on the availability of
providers and procedures together, it is apparent that courts
can use the availability tool to analyze a wide variety of
women's reproductive health controversies. As is seen in the
context of pharmacist refusal and abortion, application of the
tool may protect or undermine women's health. 179 These deci-
sions show that regardless of the factual scenario, the end re-
sult depends largely on the court's characterization of what
constitutes an available alternative.
The availability tool cases discussed leave us with signifi-
cant questions: what standard is used to determine whether a
procedure or a provider is truly an available alternative?180
Must the alternative procedure or provider be a perfect re-
placement for the one impacted by the law in question, or is
there some leeway in the fit? As will be discussed in Part IV,
the answer to these questions may determine whether the
availability tool functions to adequately value women's health
interests or to undercut them.
III. CULPABILITY
The utility of the availability tool depends upon the pres-
ence of at least a modicum of potential alternatives, which
leads to an obvious question: what can judges facing women's
health issues do when there are no alternatives? Abortion and
178. Strangely, while downplaying the medical necessity of D&X, the majority
also instructed that women who needed a D&X for health reasons could simply
have the fetus terminated by injection prior to the D&X. Id. at 164. The dissent
noted that the injection " 'poses tangible risk and provides no benefit to the
woman.'" Id. at 180 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Carhart v. Ashcroft,
331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1028 (D. Neb. 2004), aff'd, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005)).
179. Another area that may be fruitful to examine regarding the function of the
availability tool is coverage of contraceptives by health insurance. Known by
women's health advocates as "equity in prescription insurance coverage' ("EPIC"),
EPIC cases contain indicators that judges may use the availability tool. Compare
In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 939-43 (8th Cir.
2007) (citing the existence of several types of birth control available with and
without prescription as evidence that there was no Title VII violation), with
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271-72 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(holding that lack of coverage constitutes sex-based discrimination).
180. The concept of convenience, which was present in the Stormans phar-
macist refusal case, also emerges in Gonzales. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 166-67
("When standard medical options are available, mere convenience does not suffice
to displace them .... ); Stormans II, 526 F.3d 406, 408 (9th Cir. 2008); Stormans
I, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1263, 1266-67 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
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childbirth-related cases suggest that even in the absence of ro-
bust competition, judges may look to see if women themselves
are culpable for the absence of available alternatives in the
health care marketplace.
Culpability on a general level is ever-present in reproduc-
tive health controversies: the notion that women are culpable if
they become pregnant unless through rape or incest is a thread
that runs through contraception, abortion, and childbirth-
related cases.18 1 The culpability tool, however, goes beyond
morality: it is used to determine whether the lack of available
reproductive health choices in a specific case was the result of a
woman's own (bad) choice.
A. Availability's Last Dying Gasp
Reference to a woman's culpability in reproductive health
jurisprudence may represent the availability tool's last gasp for
life. The lack of viable alternative women's reproductive health
services should render the availability tool useless. But some
judges present the woman as responsible for the lack of avail-
able options in her own case and for the narrowing of choices
that resulted. In other words, if the woman had made a differ-
ent decision at an earlier time, access to the health service de-
sired would have been available. Or, if she had taken advan-
tage of available options (and had made a decision reflective of
the existing medical consensus), no controversy would exist.
The culpability tool is less apparent and decidedly more
subjective than the availability tool. The availability tool is
presented in reproductive health jurisprudence as neutral and
prospective: it looks at the present state of the market and how
181. In several cases, the Court has also implied women's culpability in a more
gratuitous fashion. See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 ("While we find no reliable
data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow." (internal citation
omitted)). The general culpability in Gonzales has no availability-related function
and is more akin to blame. Likewise, rape and incest exceptions to abortion bans
generally imply that women who had consensual sex are morally culpable if they
become pregnant. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973) (discussing consen-
sual versus nonconsensual pregnancies); Judith A.M. Scully, Book Review, 8
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 125, 133 n.18 (1997) (reviewing EILEEN L. McDONAGH,
BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT (1996)) (discuss-
ing, as an example of this argument, the federal "Hyde Amendment," which disal-
lows Medicaid funding of an abortion except in cases of rape, incest, or threat to
the pregnant woman's life).
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a regulation will impact availability going forward (and, if cor-
rectly applied, whether the alternatives are true substitutes).
As described earlier, two groups of jurists examining the same
set of facts can use the availability tool to come to two different
legal conclusions depending upon how closely potential alterna-
tives are scrutinized. The culpability tool, on the other hand, is
retrospective and inherently judgmental: it is a search for the
time in the past when a woman made a choice that narrowed
her own health care options-and thus narrowed the alterna-
tives she could access in the future. 182
The culpability tool is especially apparent as the avail-
ability of reproductive health services decreases. The tool is
used in abortion cases, where both the number of providers and
procedures can be limited. 183 Judges also use the culpability
tool in compelled cesarean section cases, where a woman disa-
grees with her physician's insistence on child delivery by
cesarean section, so the physician seeks a court order compel-
ling the woman to deliver via surgery. 184 In each of these
cases, when the culpability tool is used, the court simulta-
neously blames the woman for the predicament she faces and
returns the analysis to the availability of alternatives at an
earlier point in time. 185
Decisions show that when judges use the culpability tool,
they often refer to the narrowing of alternatives stemming from
a woman's decisions at one (or both) of two points in time. The
first point at which a woman ostensibly voluntarily narrows
her options is at viability, when she makes a choice to continue
her pregnancy rather than to abort. 186 The second point in
182. Regardless of whether such actions protect women's health, judicial inter-
vention into a woman's pregnancy-related decision calls into question a woman's
judgment and may undermine her autonomy. See Charity Scott, Resisting the
Temptation to Turn Medical Recommendations into Judicial Orders: A Recon-
sideration of Court-Ordered Surgery for Pregnant Women, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
615, 642 (1994) (explaining that "autonomy entails the expression of subjective,
rather than objective, decisionmaking").
183. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
184. See infra Part III.B. Judicial intervention in pregnancies is not limited to
cesarean sections. See generally Scott, supra note 182, at 626-30 (discussing
interventions including blood transfusions and "purse string" operations).
185. Recall the double (culpability) bind in Stormans: in order to have a cause
of action, a woman must have "failed" to access Plan B, but given that access is a
matter of "convenience," if she had failed to access Plan B, she would have been
culpable for her own failure to find a provider and thus not worthy of legal protec-
tion. See supra notes 104-06.
186. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d
457, 458 (Ga. 1981) (citing the fact that the child was viable and was thus entitled
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time at which a woman voluntarily narrows her options is
when she makes a reproductive health care choice that the
court perceives to be unsupported by health care providers.187
Either or both of these events can be used to suggest a woman's
culpability in her present health care situation, facilitating an
abbreviated discussion of her health or an avoidance of the
topic of health altogether.
One example of the first narrowing point, a woman's choice
to continue her pregnancy, can be found in Casey. The Casey
court, asserting that allowing increased regulation of abortion
post-viability was an issue of "fairness," said that "[i]n some
broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act be-
fore viability has consented to the State's intervention on
behalf of the developing child."188 In other words, Casey, when
unpacked, makes plain two ideas. First, by referring to state
intervention post-viability as a matter of "fairness," it suggests
that an element of judgment, perhaps even judgment that is
moralistic, is appropriate with regard to women's reproductive
decisions. Second is Casey's idea that the woman herself is
responsible for any state intervention she faces later in the
pregnancy if she chooses not to terminate the pregnancy pre-
viability, when alternatives to continuing the pregnancy still
to protection under Roe when ordering a woman with placenta previa to have a
cesarean section); see also In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 614 (D.C. 1987) (saying "as a
matter of law, the right of a woman to an abortion is different and distinct from
her obligations to the fetus once she has decided not to timely terminate her preg-
nancy"), vacated, 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990) (holding, after the compelled
cesarean section and death of the pregnant woman, that a substituted judgment
process should have been used where the woman was in a coma). Note that some
compelled cesarean section cases are pre-Casey, suggesting that although Casey
facilitates the availability and culpability tools, the tools are likely even more
deeply rooted. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235.
187. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'1 Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F.
Supp. 2d 1247, 1249 (N.D. Fla. 1999) (citing the pregnant woman's inability to
find a provider for her desired service); In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1263 (discussing In
re Madyun, appended to In re A.C., in which the court accused the parents of
ignoring medical advice when refusing to consent to a cesarean); Jefferson, 274
S.E.2d at 459-60 (citing the woman's refusal to have a cesarean section even
though her fetus was likely to die and her health was threatened); WVHCS-Hosp.,
Inc. v. Doe, No. 3-E-2004, 1-2 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2004),
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/WVHCSBabyDoevJaneandJohnDoe.pdf
(restraining the parents from not consenting to a cesarean based on the hospital's
verified complaint that they refused despite being advised on health risks to the
pregnant woman and fetus presented by vaginal delivery).
188. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992); see also
Scott, supra note 182, at 638 (explaining that if a woman declines to terminate a
pregnancy, she creates legal duties for her future child that are stronger than the
duties she generally owes to others).
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existed.189 Given that the first narrowing point is actually the
point at which a woman exercises a constitutionally protected
right-the right to bear a child-using it to curtail her health
interest is problematic at best and unconstitutional at worst.190
To imply otherwise is to imply that by exercising a constitu-
tional right to have a child, a woman subjects herself wholesale
to the coercive powers of the state, an implication that would
render the very existence of the right itself meaningless. 191
The second narrowing point referenced in reproductive
health decisions is the time at which a woman makes a repro-
ductive health care choice perceived to be unsupported by the
health care system. Because availability is often considered a
protector of women's health, judges may hold women respon-
sible if women choose not to take advantage of existing ser-
vices. Moreover, judges may be inclined to accept the risk as-
sessment made by physicians, as opposed to women them-
selves, in cases where a woman's desire conflicts with that of
her doctor, another indicator that the woman is culpable for
her situation. 192
B. Culpability and Compelled Cesarean Sections
One vivid example of a situation in which availability of
reproductive health services may be lacking and where a signif-
icant clash of legal interests is present is childbirth. Some
women have been court-ordered to undergo cesarean sections,
189. The state can intervene in pregnancy in many additional ways. See gen-
erally Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of
Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1325, 1325-28 (1990) [hereinafter, Note, Rethink-
ing (M)otherhood] (discussing forced blood transfusions; detention of the mother
to stop potentially harmful behavior by the pregnant woman, such as drug use;
detention to force potentially beneficial behavior by the pregnant woman, such as
medical treatment; and that state intervention can be civil or criminal in nature).
190. See infra Part IV (discussing the misapplications of the culpability tool).
191. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat-
ters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
192. Judges may buy into the "technological imperative," a presumption that
the risk assessments of medical professionals are superior to the risk assessments
made by pregnant woman. See Scott, supra note 182, at 659; see also Marguerite
A. Driessen, Avoiding the Melissa Rowland Dilemma: Why Disobeying a Doctor
Should Not Be A Crime, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 40-41 (2006) (discussing
the ironic fact that the same judges who may view women as irrational decision
makers at the time of delivery oversee hundreds of thousands of medical malprac-
tice lawsuits per year).
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despite their desire to deliver vaginally.193 It is not hyperbolic
to say that compelled cesarean sections (or the threat of them)
have led to dramatic scenarios: a woman being forcibly
restrained, sedated, and carted into an operating room as her
screaming partner was forcibly removed;194 a woman facing
compelled cesarean section "escaping" from a hospital and at-
tempting birth in hiding;195 a woman's alleged refusal to con-
sent to a cesarean section resulting in criminal charges being
filed against her;196 and, in one case, the trauma of a forced
cesarean leading to the father's suicide.197 In a recent case, a
woman who refused a cesarean section and gave birth vagi-
nally to a healthy child subsequently lost custody of her child,
based initially on her refusal to have a cesarean section.198 The
stakes are high for all involved in a potential compelled
cesarean section.
193. The frequency of compelled cesarean sections is difficult to estimate be-
cause of the nature of the proceedings, which may be oral, rushed, and which may
result in cryptic state trial-level court decisions. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d
1235, 1248 (D.C. 1990) (noting the procedural shortcomings in compelled cesarean
section proceedings, including inadequate notice and representation of parties,
substandard arguments, and the absence of opportunities for appeal). The Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists says that judicial intervention in
birth choice undermines women's autonomy and their trust in their medical pro-
viders, potentially causing them to deliver without medical care. See Driessen,
supra note 192, at 42-43; see also Michael J. Myers, ACOG's Vaginal Birth After
Cesarean Standard: A Market Restraint Without Remedy?, 49 S.D. L. REV. 526,
527-28 (2004) (observing that women are often dissuaded from having a vaginal
delivery, which provides revenues of approximately $6,000 to $8,000 per proce-
dure, while cesarean sections provide between $14,000 and $17,000 each).
194. Driessen, supra note 192, at 36-37 (describing the compelled cesarean
section of a Nigerian woman, whose husband later killed himself).
195. The result of court-ordered cesarean sections is that the extent of repro-
ductive rights is necessarily conditioned on the physical place in which they are
exercised: if a pregnant woman chooses to use traditional medical facilities, she
surrenders her autonomy at the hospital door. See Scott, supra note 182, at 667
(noting that surrendering her rights is not the result of any illegal activity).
196. Driessen, supra note 192, at 2-3 (discussing the arrest of a woman for
first-degree murder after the woman delayed consenting to a cesarean section
despite being told by her physician that the health of twin fetuses was in
jeopardy; one was stillborn).
197. See id. at 36-37 (discussing the court-ordered cesarean section of a
Nigerian woman, pregnant with triplets, who had refused the surgery out of fear
that a repeat cesarean section would not be available in Nigeria for subsequent
pregnancies. The hospital lied to the woman and husband, saying they could at-
tempt a vaginal delivery, only to present them with the court order when she ar-
rived in labor. The woman, screaming, was forcibly restrained and sedated. The
husband was forcibly removed from the hospital by security guards and subse-
quently killed himself).
198. N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. V.M., 974 A.2d 448, 449 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
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The culpability tool may be attractive to judges in child-
birth-related cases, where childbirth methods can be in dispute
because competition to provide childbirth services at the time
of labor may be low. Even though the number of obstetricians
may be large in any particular geographic area, for practical
purposes, once in labor, a woman's ability to access a new phy-
sician is limited. At the time of delivery, many physicians are
unwilling to treat a woman who was not previously their pa-
tient, and assistance from a new doctor may be even less likely
when there are complications surrounding the delivery. 199
Even if a provider willing to provide the woman's preferred
childbirth method is hypothetically available, there may not be
time to access that alternative provider. This fact suggests
that a judge facing a request for a court-ordered cesarean sec-
tion should not be able to rely on the presence of available al-
ternatives to analyze the woman's health interest. Instead,
judges rely on the woman's culpability in the absence of compe-
tition rather than focusing simply on health ramifications
posed by any court decision.
Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Cen-
ter exemplifies how the culpability tool functions in the area of
compelled cesarean sections. 200  In Pemberton, a pregnant
199. Difficulty finding a doctor later in pregnancy is reported anecdotally by
many women. See, e.g., Roy Wood, High-Risk Pregnancy Fuels Fears, CINCINNATI
POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at A12 (reporting that one woman had to call nearly one
dozen doctors before finding someone willing to care for her during her last month
of pregnancy); Dana DiFilippo, Changing Your OB-GYN: The Challenges of
Switching Doctors, PARENTS.COM, http://www.parents.com/pregnancy/labor-
delivery/support/changing-ob-gyn/?page=2 (last visited June 13, 2009) (asserting
that doctors are reluctant to take new patients if they are advanced in their
pregnancy).
200. 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999). For a similar example, see In re
Madyun, a case involving a pregnant teenager who, after laboring for more than 2
days, was told by physicians that she needed a cesarean section to avert possible
infection. In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. July 26, 1986) reprinted in In re
A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1260 app. (D.C. 1990). Madyun, who was Muslim, expressed
religious objections to having a cesarean section. Id. at 1260 app. The court, cit-
ing the fact that the child was viable, and that, in wanting a vaginal delivery,
Madyun was acting in direct contravention of medical experts, ordered a cesarean
section. Id. at 1262-63 app. The baby was born with no infection. Driessen,
supra note 192, at 34. The Madyun case is discussed extensively in The Coloniza-
tion of the Womb, by Nancy Ehrenreich. 43 DuKE L.J. 492, 524-35, 556-64
(1993); see also In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 614 (D.C. 1987) (citing both viability and
medical opinion-based culpability); WVHCS-Hosp., Inc. v. Doe, No. 3-E-2004, 1-2
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2004), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/
WVHCSBabyDoevJaneandJohnDoe.pdf (restraining a pregnant woman and her
husband from refusing a cesarean section without discussing women's health
risks in a perfunctory court order in response to a motion by a hospital); id. at 3
142 [Vol. 81
THE INVISIBLE WOMAN
woman who had a prior cesarean section tried unsuccessfully to
find a physician who would attend her in a vaginal delivery.20 1
She decided to give birth at home with no medical assistance
but during labor went to the hospital emergency room solely for
hydration.202 The attending physician declined to provide the
requested services, instead contacting supervising physicians,
all of whom thought that a cesarean section was necessary. 203
Meanwhile, Pemberton left the hospital. 204 At that point, the
hospital attorney instituted court proceedings to compel Pem-
berton to have a cesarean section, to which a judge agreed. 205
Law enforcement was dispatched to Pemberton's home, and she
was returned to the hospital against her will via ambulance.206
After a bedside hearing, a judge ordered Pemberton to have a
cesarean section, and doctors performed the procedure against
her will.207 After the birth of her child, Pemberton sued the
hospital for violating her constitutional rights.208
In its decision, the court used the culpability tool before
finding in the hospital's favor. First, in the court's eyes, Pem-
berton voluntarily limited her health care options when she
chose not to terminate her pregnancy.209 The Pemberton court
cited Roe and stated that Pemberton sought only to limit her
childbirth options, not to forgo having a child altogether, imply-
ing that her post-viability reproductive health care choices
were somehow less weighty because she chose to continue her
pregnancy.210 Moreover, Pemberton sought health care that
was not supported by providers: a vaginal delivery after a prior
cesarean section. 211 The court said that the lack of competition
(citing Roe v. Wade and the right of the "full term viable fetus" to have decisions
made for its health independent of its parent's wishes and omitting any discussion
of the pregnant woman's health).
201. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 (explaining that Pemberton's prior ce-
sarean section was accomplished via a vertical incision, which presents a risk of
uterine rupture during subsequent deliveries).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (stating she departed "against medical advice" and "surreptitiously").
205. Id. at 1250 (The doctors testified that vaginal birth posed a substantial
risk of death to the fetus.).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1249 (asserting substantive and procedural due process rights
violations).
209. See id. at 1251-52.
210. See id.
211. See John Zweifler et al., Vaginal Birth After Cesarean in California: Be-
fore and After and Change in Guidelines, 4 ANNALS FAM. MED. 228 (2006) (noting
that after the adoption of restrictive vaginal birth after cesarean, or "VBAC,"
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to provide Pemberton with vaginal delivery services was
"hardly surprising" given the estimated 2 percent risk of
uterine rupture (and 50 percent risk of fetal death if rupture
occurred).2 12 In other words, there were no providers for the
service because it was simply an inappropriate service to
request. Therefore, the court held Pemberton culpable for the
lack of VBAC services she desired.
The operation of the culpability tool in Pemberton allowed
the court to truncate its analysis of women's health. The deci-
sion suggests that Pemberton was responsible for the lack of
available providers; thus her interests were more easily subro-
gated to those of the fetus. 213 The nine-page decision focuses
almost exclusively on the health of the "baby," relegating the
pregnant woman's health-and the significant health risks
presented by cesarean sections-to a few parenthetical refer-
ences and one brief footnote.2 14 The court's response to Pem-
berton's assertion that the forced cesarean section presented
risks to her health was flippant: "Medical procedures rarely are
[without risk]."215 The court inferred from one expert's failure
guidelines in 1999, the number of VBACs declined more than 10 percent, but neo-
natal and infant mortality rates failed to improve); David Dobbs, VBAC Backlash:
Why Are Hospitals Forbidding Women Who Have Had C-sections the Right to
Have Vaginal Births?, SLATE, Dec. 28, 2004, http://www.slate.comlid/21114991
(describing the trend of hospitals banning VBACs).
212. See Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1253 (noting a 2 to 2.2 percent risk of
rupture, according to one physician).
213. See Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood, supra note 189, at 1339-40 (noting
that a pregnant woman is seen as self-interested, thus her opinion is easily
ignored by courts).
214. See Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1253 (saying "there is a very substantial
risk of uterine rupture and resulting death of the baby (as well as serious injury
to the mother)"); id. at 1254 (stating "based on the evidence disclosed by this
record, this was an extraordinary and overwhelming case; no reasonable or even
unreasonable argument could be made in favor of vaginal delivery at home with
the attendant risk of death to the baby (and concomitant grave risk to the moth-
er)"); id. at 1256 (noting "a vaginal birth in these circumstances would have pre-
sented a substantial risk of uterine rupture and resulting death of the baby, as
well as a substantial risk to the health of the mother"); Rita Rubin, Study Ex-
amines Moms' C-Section Complications, USA TODAY, Jan. 20, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-01-20-c-sectionsN.htm (citing a
study finding, between 1998-99 and 2004-05, a "90% increase in blood transfu-
sions;" "a 50% increase in ... blood clots in the lungs;" and a "20% increase in
rates of kidney failure, respiratory distress syndrome, shock and the need for a
ventilator").
215. See Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1254 n.18. Note the court's use of the
word "procedure" to describe a cesarean section, which is a major surgery that re-
quires the opening of the abdominal cavity and movement of major organs.
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to quantify them that the risks are minimal.216 The court did
not analyze the risks the cesarean section posed to Pemberton,
despite the fact that cesarean sections present such significant
health risks that reducing their frequency is a goal of the fed-
eral government. 217
While Pemberton typifies judicial use of the culpability
tool, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the culpability
tool always results in a Pemberton-like analysis. The culpa-
bility tool is not always used, even in cases where access to
given reproductive health services is severely limited. Some
cases, including compelled cesarean section cases, forgo the
culpability tool altogether and focus instead on a detailed anal-
ysis of women's health issues at the time of delivery.218 In re
Baby Boy Doe, for example, exhaustively details the risks, both
minor and major, a woman faces when she undergoes a ce-
sarean section 2 19-and, in doing so, goes out of its way to dis-
claim the pregnant woman of any fault or responsibility she
bears for her situation. 220 Although the number of identifiable
compelled cesarean section cases is too small to make definitive
generalizations, it appears that the cases that forgo the culpa-
bility tool instead emphasize women's health and autonomy.221
This makes sense: why would a court emphasize a woman's
216. See id. Nowhere in the decision are the risks of a cesarean section de-
scribed or discussed.
217. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Vaginal Birth After
Cesarean Birth- California, 1996-2000, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
989, 996 (2002) (citing the reduction of cesarean sections as a "national health
objective" for first-time deliveries and vaginal deliveries after prior cesarean
sections).
218. See generally In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(conducting a detailed analysis of the impact cesarean sections have on women's
health and holding that a woman's choice to refuse a cesarean section must be
honored even when it will harm the fetus).
219. See id. at 328-29 (discussing that the mortality rate for cesarean sections
is double that of vaginal delivery, involves increased recovery time and pain, and
may damage other maternal organs).
220. See id. at 332 (saying it is the mother's actions that form the environment
for the fetus, and " '[t]hat this is so is not a pregnant woman's fault; it is a fact of
life'" (quoting Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ill. 1988))).
221. See id.; In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237-53 (D.C. 1990) (majority not using
the culpability tool and finding in the woman's favor); id. at 1256 (Belson, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (citing a woman's choice to bear a child as
voluntarily putting herself in a "special class" of persons upon whom another's life
depends totally). Similar reliance on an autonomy rationale is suggested in a re-
cent U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia decision addressing allega-
tions that the District of Columbia government forced institutionalized persons to
have abortions. See Does I through III v. Dist. of Columbia, 593 F. Supp. 2d 115,
125 (D.D.C. 2009).
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culpability if it wants to find in her favor? This returns us to
one of the initial observations about the culpability tool-it is
judgmental-and suggests that whether the tool is used at all
may depend on the end result desired.
Reference to a women's purported culpability is truly the
last, dying gasp of the availability tool. It is an attempt to
return to the rhetoric of availability, even in the absence of
available alternatives. Regardless of how it is applied, how-
ever, by virtue of the fact that it seeks to use an availability
tool-based analysis even when alternatives may be utterly lack-
ing, the culpability tool's mere existence reinforces the signifi-
cance of available alternatives to the analysis of women's re-
productive health issues in reproductive health jurisprudence.
IV. THE TOOLS' UTILITY: THEORETICAL V. ACTUAL
The question remains as to whether either the availability
tool or the culpability tool-or both-can be useful when ana-
lyzing restrictions on reproductive health products, providers,
or services. As Part A discusses, theoretically, the tools have
an undeniable appeal: if something is taken away, the visceral
reaction is to immediately look to see if it can be replaced. But
as Part B concludes, the complexities of actually determining
whether a suitable substitute exists may overwhelm the tools'
utility.
A. Theoretical Utility
Theoretically, the availability and culpability tools may be
applied in a way that adequately protects women's reproduc-
tive health. The availability tool presumes that when a law
eliminates a reproductive health provider or procedure women
must be able to replace that provider or procedure with an al-
ternative. Thus, the availability tool contains an underlying
assumption that the reproductive health services currently on
the market are either necessary to protect women's health, pro-
tected by law, or both. Likewise, the culpability tool assumes
that doctors should be permitted to protect women's health by
inserting their judgment when another medical decision could
result in physical harm to the woman.
Each tool, then, has the potential to assist judges in ana-
lyzing the impact a law or decision may have on women's
health and deciding whether that impact can be adequately
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mitigated. The availability tool, for example, could function
correctly and uphold an abortion procedure ban if there existed
either an alternative procedure with the exact same health
risk-benefit profile as the banned procedure or an available
procedure that provided superior health protection to that of
the banned procedure. The culpability tool would "work" in a
case where a court compelled a pregnant woman to have a ce-
sarean section in the face of 100 percent certainty of death if
she chose vaginal delivery. "Work," in this case, means that
the judge's hypothetical reference to a woman's choice to con-
tinue her pregnancy post-viability and doctors' refusal to assist
in a misguided vaginal delivery could be cited by the judge to
find the woman culpable, thereby allowing the judges to compel
her to undertake a better, safer course of action.
While the tools may advance women's health in some
hypothetical scenarios, application of the availability tool and
culpability tool do not address other significant legal
interests-they can take jurists and litigators only so far.
Whenever a woman is forced to use a reproductive health pro-
vider, product, or service not of her choosing-regardless of the
availability of alternatives-significant privacy, sex-based
equality, and autonomy interests are triggered and must be
addressed.222
The availability and culpability tools do not provide an
analytical framework for adjudicating autonomy issues, which
are frequently part of women's reproductive health cases. Re-
cently, for example, a New Jersey woman who refused to have
a cesarean section (and subsequently delivered a healthy baby
vaginally) initially lost custody of her child based in part on her
"irrational" refusal to consent to a cesarean. 223 Although the
culpability tool could have functioned in this case in order to
help the judge decide whether the cesarean section would pro-
222. See supra Parts II-III (discussing contraception, abortion, and childbirth
cases).
223. Although the appellate majority opinion did not address the issue of
whether the refusal to consent to a cesarean could be used as evidence of child
abuse because it found sufficient alternative evidence of abuse, the concurrence
squarely addressed the autonomy issues presented in the case and said women's
decisions about whether to undergo invasive procedures such as cesareans should
not be used as bases for abuse and neglect. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
V.M., 974 A.2d 448, 465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). The trial court opinion
in this case was unavailable at the time of publication, so precisely whether and
how the culpability tool is used remains unknown, but the facts suggest its
operation.
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tect the woman's health, the tool would not have helped the
judge address the obvious autonomy issues presented.
B. Actual Utility
When we move from hypothetical to actual reproductive
health cases, two minimum criteria must be satisfied if the
availability or the culpability tool is to be used to analyze
women's health issues. First, the analysis must accurately de-
termine the availability of alternatives. Without accurate
analysis and identification of potential alternatives, the use of
the availability and culpability tools may actually pose risks to
women's health, as judges may overestimate access to safe re-
productive health care. Second, courts must apply the avail-
ability and culpability tools neutrally, not as a means to a de-
sired end. Without satisfying both of these requirements, the
availability tool and culpability tool may undervalue women's
health relative to competing interests.
1. Identifying True Alternatives
To assess whether sufficient alternatives are available to
protect women's reproductive health when a law threatens the
continued availability of a reproductive health service, a judge
must thoroughly understand the situation of the women seek-
ing (or who might seek) the procedure or provider and the
landscape of alternatives. This can be an exceedingly challeng-
ing task, especially if judges are considering a facial challenge
to a law. In reproductive health matters, the constitutionality
of a law should be determined not by whether the law threat-
ens the health of the majority of women but by whether it
threatens the minority, whose health concerns may be rarer
but significant. 224 So, for example, a judge should not only con-
sider the women in Seattle seeking Plan B but also the predi-
cament of rural women in Washington in order to truly address
women's health. An accurate application of the availability tool
224. Planned Parenthood v. Casey provides an excellent example of this point.
There the husband notification provision was struck because a minority of
women--domestic violence victims-would have suffered unduly from its
requirements. 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (finding that notification was an "undue
burden" even though it may only impact less than 1 percent of women seeking
abortions).
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presupposes the availability of complete factual information for
analysis.
Moreover, the cornerstone of the availability tool-
"availability"-is undefined, thus it is left to judges to deter-
mine what available providers or procedures are sufficient to
protect women's health from the impact of the law in question.
Judges who misidentify the relevant alternatives or fail to do
the in-depth examination necessary to determine whether
there is a close enough "fit" between the threatened provider or
procedure and its proposed replacement may leave women's
health inadequately protected.
Instances of misidentified or incorrectly analyzed availabil-
ity of alternatives are readily identifiable in reproductive rights
jurisprudence. Take, for example, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,
the case involving pharmacist refusal. 225 Recall that in Stor-
mans, at issue was whether allowing pharmacists to refuse to
dispense contraceptives would harm women's health, and
whether requiring pharmacists to so dispense violated their re-
ligious freedom.226 The Stormans I and II courts found in favor
of the pharmacists, relying upon a survey that showed that out
of 121 pharmacies, ninety-three typically stocked emergency
contraceptives while twenty-eight did not.227 According to
Stormans II, the presence of competing Plan B providers and
the absence of any evidence of failure to access Plan B proved
that there was no women's health issue to be vindicated in the
state of Washington.228
The availability cited in Stormans I and II, however, was a
red herring. The number of pharmacies that stocked Plan B
was not the issue, the willingness of individual pharmacists to
provide Plan B to specific women was. 229 It makes no differ-
ence to a woman needing Plan B that the pharmacy's shelves
are stocked with Plan B if no pharmacist on duty will give it to
her. Stormans I and II failed to address the type of availability
truly at issue in the case-the presence of individual pharma-
cists willing to dispense Plan B-and although Stormans III
225. See supra Part II.B(1) (discussing the case as an example of provider-
based availability tool use).
226. See supra Part I.B(i).
227. Of the pharmacies that did not stock Plan B, eighteen cited low demand,
three relied on an "easy alternative source," and two cited religious or personal
reasons. Stormans II, 526 F.3d 406, 408-09 (9th Cir. 2008).
228. See id.
229. See id.
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may have recognized this problem, it inexplicably failed to heed
it in its analysis.
Moreover, although the statistics cited in the Stormans
cases show that a majority of pharmacies stocked Plan B, al-
most one-quarter of the pharmacies did not.230 For the avail-
ability tool to function effectively, on remand, the lower court
must perform a detailed analysis of the entire factual land-
scape, including, for example, geographic distribution of the
pharmacies that stocked Plan B (and those that did not), tak-
ing into consideration their location in relation to other provid-
ers (in the event of a refusal), item price, insurances accepted,
hours open, and, most significantly, the presence of individual
pharmacists willing to dispense Plan B. The Ninth Circuit's
decision in Stormans III hinted at the importance of some of
these factors, but it did not clearly articulate their
significance. 231
The availability tool runs into similar problems in the
abortion context. In abortion cases, determining the true
availability of competing providers requires detailed analysis of
the reproductive health care market on a local level. For ex-
ample, providers may only be present in a particular state for
one or two days per month, some providing only certain abor-
tion services. 232 Does the existence of occasional, fly-in service
providers adequately protect women's health when a full-time,
in-state provider faces closure due to increased regulations?
And what is the impact on women's health if the "available"
provider, relied upon in a case to protect women's health,
leaves practice?233 The courts must closely scrutinize potential
available alternative providers (or services).
Moreover, as Gonzales demonstrates, significant medical
controversy can exist over whether a particular women's repro-
ductive health procedure is irreplaceable because of its specific
health benefits. 234 When a procedure regulation or ban is con-
230. Stormans III, Nos. 07-36039, 07-36040, 2009 WL 3448435, at *21 (9th Cir.
Oct. 28, 2009).
231. Id. at *2, *21 (noting the lack of statistics on refusing pharmacists); id. at
*26 (noting the availability of hypothetical alternative providers within a five-mile
radius).
232. See generally SUSAN WICKLUND, THIS COMMON SECRET: MY JOURNEY As
AN ABORTION DOCTOR (2007) (giving a first-hand account of traveling to multiple
states per month to provide abortion services and detailing what services she
would and would not provide).
233. See Jones et al., supra note 111, at 6 (noting the declining number of abor-
tion providers in recent years).
234. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 186-87 (2007).
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sidered, a court must resist the urge to simplify what is an ad-
mittedly complex analysis of medical facts by relying on the
purported availability of a substitute for the threatened proce-
dure unless the court first undertakes its own nuanced compar-
ison of the threatened procedure and its hypothetical
substitute.
The availability tool is only useful if enough facts are de-
veloped to allow the judge to understand both the threatened
provider, service, or product, and its replacement. This re-
quires the parties to develop a complete factual record and
present a sophisticated analysis of the health care landscape.
The need for expert medical testimony is almost guaranteed.
Economists may also be needed to fully understand the rele-
vant market. The application of the tools can only be as good
as the information provided to the court.
Similar problems arise when judges use the culpability
tool. When the culpability tool is used, no alternatives are
present, so the inquiry concerns not whether there is an alter-
native but why no alternatives are available. The tool allows
women to be blamed for their failure to access services at a
time when there was widespread availability. According to
some judges, the first time women narrow their own options is
prior to viability, when women can abort their pregnancy but
choose not to, thus subjecting them to state intervention. 235
The result is that women are placed in the ultimate double
bind-they must access available services by terminating their
pregnancy prior to viability or continue the pregnancy, making
only those health choices supported by the particular providers
or by a judge. 236 This line of reasoning is legally unsupport-
able. Describing women as culpable, in part, for their choice to
continue a pregnancy penalizes them for exercising their con-
stitutional right to have a child.237 For this reason, courts
must abandon the viability-culpability argument.
Aside from the viability issue, whether a woman should
ever be held culpable for a lack of available reproductive health
235. See supra Part III and accompanying notes (discussing the operation of
the culpability tool).
236. Significantly, the availability and culpability tools fail to account for cer-
tain women's inability to access providers and services, specifically women with
limited financial means.
237. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
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care choices is a difficult question. Certainly the existence of
available providers or services (or lack thereof) may provide a
judge insight into whether a woman's choice is generally sup-
ported by the medical community and therefore whether it is
good or bad for her health. However, the lack of available med-
ical services must be closely examined because the inability to
access services may indicate the existence of other constraints,
such as insurance- or hospital-based limitations on providers or
services-not just that the service sought is somehow medically
inappropriate for the woman to request.238
As the cesarean section cases show, situations may exist
where the woman's choice of medical treatment is risky for her
health or fetal health or both. As previously discussed, the
question should then become whether the culpability tool
should be used to override a woman's autonomy.239 What do
we do when a woman is making a decision that is bad for her
health or we find morally reprehensible? The presence of sig-
nificant autonomy issues where the culpability tool is used
should provoke caution in its users: the culpability tool can be
the first step in a legal analysis, but a careful balancing of
other interests-autonomy included-is the culpability tool's
necessary corollary.
Unless both the women's reproductive health care market-
place and the facts at bar are thoroughly understood, the avail-
ability and culpability tools have the propensity to be applied
incompletely-and perhaps dangerously-because they may
facilitate an overestimation of the presence of available alter-
natives or facilitate mischaracterization of whether these
alternatives are capable of protecting women's health.240
238. See Mary Forney, Hospital Policy Pains Expectant Mom, LAKE POWELL
CHRON., Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.lakepowellchronicle.com/v2 news-articles
.php?heading-z0&storyjd=1849&page=77 (telling the story of a hospital that pro-
hibited vaginal deliveries after a prior cesarean section and one pregnant woman
who was told refusing a cesarean at that hospital would lead to court action); Rita
Rubin, Battle Lines Drawn of C-Sections, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.comlnews/health/2005-08-23-csection-battlex.htm (citing
the fact that vaginal deliveries after cesareans are often not available to women
because of legal and insurance concerns, not medical risk).
239. For a thorough discussion of autonomy generally, see Dr. Kim Treiger-
Bar-Am, In Defense of Autonomy: An Ethic of Care, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 548
(2008) (discussing the right to privacy as inherent in autonomy).
240. One meaningful check on whether availability actually protects women's
health in a particular circumstance is to examine women's ability to actually
access those alternative services or providers.
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2. Applying Tools Neutrally
The drive to accurately define what constitutes availability
in any particular case assumes, of course, that courts are ap-
plying the availability and culpability tools neutrally in a
search for the truth behind the availability of women's health
services. That assumption may be incorrect. The tools may be
entirely a means to an end.
Neutrality can be an issue at the very outset of the avail-
ability tool's use, when a judge is called on to define the rele-
vant alternatives in a case. Having identified theoretical
alternatives for a threatened service, a judge must determine
how closely the theoretical replacement "fits" with the service
threatened. In other words, at the conclusion of the case, must
women have the safest options available to them, as they did
prior to the restriction at issue, or is the availability of a "safe"
option sufficient?241 How a judge defines the "fit" needed may
simply reflect the desired outcome of a case.
Proper use of the availability and culpability tools may also
be hindered by another erroneous belief: the belief that low
availability is present when there is low demand, and therefore
a reproductive health service perceived to be little-used is not
deserving of protection. Such a belief in the context of repro-
ductive health services is unsupportable. Statistics show that
birth control is one of the most-used reproductive health ser-
vices in a woman's lifetime;242 abortion, although slowly declin-
ing in use, is still widely relied upon;243 and the availability of
vaginal delivery, particularly after a prior cesarean, may be
dwindling not due to women's desire, but because of regulatory
and insurance constraints. 244 Regardless of the frequency of
use, these services must be as safe as possible for women lest
they impair women's health and overall autonomy.
Finally, both tools are subject to politically oriented
misuse. Increasingly, judges in reproductive rights cases are
not hiding their political leanings in decisions. In abortion
cases, in particular, judges may refer to a pregnant woman as a
"mother," a fetus may be referred to as a "baby," and a physi-
241. See supra Part II.C (discussing the use of the terms "safe" and "safest" in
Stenberg and Gonzales).
242. NARAL Pro-Choice America, supra note 27 (saying 98 percent of women
use birth control at some time in their lives).
243. There were an estimated 1.2 million abortions provided in 2005. See
Jones et al., supra note 111, at 6.
244. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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cian who provides abortions as an "abortion doctor."245 In
forced cesarean section cases, judges portray women as selfish
and uncaring for questioning the opinions of their physicians,
regardless of the woman's motive or even the ultimate birth
outcome.246 Strident rhetoric undermines the legitimacy of
judicial decisions in all cases, but issues of legitimacy may be
particularly magnified in women's health cases, where the
court's role in disputes is routinely questioned. If the availabil-
ity or culpability tool is surrounded by rhetoric that is openly
hostile to one side, and if application of these tools operates the
vast majority of the time to further restrict women's health
services, the neutrality of the application must necessarily be
called into question.
Identifying the pitfalls of the availability and culpability
tools does not necessarily render them useless. To the con-
trary, each of the tools may help organize the analysis of ques-
tions of law that are fraught not only with legal complexities
but also with very real emotion. Like any tool or legal frame-
work, courts must carefully apply the availability and culpabil-
ity tools lest they morph into nothing more than shortcuts that
undermine rather than facilitate the necessary analysis.
CONCLUSION
The availability tool and, to a more limited extent, the cul-
pability tool have the potential to be useful in reproductive
rights jurisprudence. These tools, however, must make up only
one part of a holistic analysis of women's health, including in-
quiries into relevant autonomy, privacy, and equity rights and
a subsequent weighing against competing interests.
Regardless of the use-or misuse-of the availability and
culpability tools, their utility may be finite. Ironically, when
the availability tool is used to uphold regulations that decrease
access to providers or procedures, its utility weakens. Take, for
example, Greenville Women's Clinic, which upheld regulations
on the basis of the continued presence of available providers
245. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 186-87 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (noting that, in its rhetoric, "[tjhe Court's hostility to the right Roe and
Casey secured is not concealed").
246. See In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. July 26, 1986) reprinted in In re
A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1263 app. (D.C. 1990) ("It is one thing for an adult to gamble
with nature regarding his or her own life; it is quite another when the gamble in-
volves the life or death of an unborn infant.").
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but, in doing so, likely decreased availability. 247 The next
judge addressing a reproductive health controversy in that
South Carolina area will have fewer providers to rely upon
when deciding the case. Or consider Gonzales, which upheld a
procedure ban on partial-birth abortion, leaving fewer substi-
tute procedures.248 When the next federal procedural ban
comes, will available alternatives exist for the court to use the
availability tool to decide the controversy? For example, could
a court uphold a total ban on surgical abortions based on the
continuing availability of medical abortion? One day, might an
argument suggesting that surgical abortion is necessary for
those women who decided to abort after the gestational cutoff
for medical abortion be met successfully with culpability-based
arguments that those women waived their right to abort by not
deciding within the timeline required to access a medical
abortion?
Use of the availability tool may only delay the very type of
case both sides of the reproductive rights debate strive to
avoid-one demanding the resolution of a direct conflict be-
tween women's health and the state's desire to restrict repro-
ductive health services, one in which no available alternative
exists not because of a woman's actions, but because of prolific
government reproductive rights restrictions. It may be in this
scenario, where neither the availability tool nor the culpability
tool can function, that women-and their health-become
visible again. 249
247. See supra notes 112-35 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
249. See Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering Faulty
Premises Infecting Reproductive Rights, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 147, 157-58
(1996) (saying women as independent people are invisible in the law, and that the
law views women only through their reproductive capacity).
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